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THE RISE AND FALL OF HISTORIC CHIEF JUSTICES:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND JUDICIAL
LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA
By Stefanus Hendrianto †
Abstract:
In the decade following its inception, the Indonesian
Constitutional Court has marked a new chapter in Indonesian legal history, one in which
a judicial institution can challenge the executive and legislative branches. This article
argues that judicial leadership is the main contributing factor explaining the emergence of
judicial power in Indonesia. This article posits that the newly established Indonesian
Constitutional Court needed a strong and skilled Chief Justice to build the institution
because it had insufficient support from political actors. As the Court lacked a wellestablished tradition of judicial review, it needed a visionary leader who could maximize
the structural advantage of the Court. Finally, the Court needed a heroic leader able to
deal with the challenges and pressures from the government. This article examines the
role of the four Chief Justices of the Indonesian Constitutional Court: Jimly Asshiddiqie
(2003–2008), Mohammad Mahfud (2008–2013), Akil Mochtar (2013), and Hamdan
Zoelva (2013–2015). Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie and Muhmmad Mahfud set a high
bar by playing the role of heroic Chief Justices. The departure of Asshiddiqie and
Mahfud, however, marked the end an era of heroic Chief Justices. Both Chief Justices
Akil Mochtar and Hamdan Zoelva could not maintain the role of heroic Chief Justice.

I.

INTRODUCTION

When the former Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court,
Akil Mochtar was arrested in October 2013 for alleged bribery, his story
immediately made international headlines.1 It may come as a surprise to
many that by the time of his arrest, Mochtar had held the position of Chief
Justice for just six months. It is clear that international communities—
†
This article could not have been written without the continuous advice and encouragement of
Clark Lombardi, University of Washington Law School. I would like to thank Dean Lisa Kloppenberg of
Santa Clara University School of Law who extender her support for me to write this article during my time
in Santa Clara. I am grateful to Rosalind Dixon of University of New South Wales School of Law, who
worked hard to bring me to Sydney, Australia for the Workshop on “Constitutional Court and Democracy
in Indonesia: Judging the First Decade.” In the workshop, I benefited from Mark Tushnet’s comments on
the idea of a heroic court, which eventually led me to write this article. I would like to acknowledge Luthfi
Eddyono and Bivitri Susanti for their valuable assistance in gathering data from the Indonesian
Constitutional Court. Finally, special thanks to Jennie Sevedge, Tim O’Brien and Claire Harvey, who
provided terrific editorial assistance on the earlier drafts.
1
Joe Chochrane, Top Indonesian Judge Held in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2013 at A1; I
Made Sentana & Joko Hariyanto, Indonesia Detains a Top Judge Over Alleged Corruption, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303492504579113253416780; You’re
nicked, your honour: An anti-corruption investigation touches the constitutional court, THE ECONOMIST
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21587849-anti-corruption-investigation-touchesconstitutional-court-youre-nicked-your-honour; Indonesia arrests top judge on corruption charges, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24344995.
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especially those composed of lawyers, legal scholars and law students—
must be provided with a better narrative of the Indonesian Constitutional
history. Before this disgraced Chief Justice, there were two great Chief
Justices: Jimly Asshiddiqie and Mohammad Mahfud. These two Chief
Justices never made international headlines like their successor, but they
contributed extensively to the struggle for the rule of law during postauthoritarian Indonesia, particularly in solidifying the Court as an institution.
This article examines the role of the four Chief Justices of the
Indonesian Constitutional Court: Jimly Asshiddiqie (2003–2008),
Mohammad Mahfud (2008–2013), Akil Mochtar (2013), and Hamdan
Zoelva (2013–2015). Before exploring the roles played by each of these
four Chief Justices, clarifications are necessary. First, this article is a study
of judicial empowerment rather than a study of each Chief Justice’s
personality. By judicial empowerment, this article refers to the process of
how the Court balances power between the judicial, executive, and
legislative branches of government. 2 In the decade following its inception,
the Indonesian Constitutional Court has marked a new chapter in Indonesian
legal history. It is one in which a judicial institution can challenge the
executive and legislative branches. This article argues that the architects
behind this success story were the first two Chief Justices: Jimly Asshiddiqie
and Mohammad Mahfud. Armed with a strong leadership style, both
Asshiddiqie and Mahfud led the Court to issue several decisions that
challenged governmental policies and pushed the government to abide by
the Constitution.
Second, by analyzing the role of judicial leadership, this article
addresses the question that constitutional law scholars and political scientists
have asked: how is a Court with no army or coercive power able to constrain
the other branches of government? 3 Stated otherwise, why would the
2
Legal scholars and political scientists have come up with many different theories that explain
judicial empowerment. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003) [hereinafter GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES]; RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as Deliberative
Institutions: Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST
AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2003); ALEXI TROCHEV, JUDGING RUSSIA:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN RUSSIAN POLITICS, 1990–2006 (2008).
3
See Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and
Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723 (2009).
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Executive branch ever comply with the Court’s decisions? In particular, I
explore the question of how the Court manages to bolster its judicial power
in a new democracy like Indonesia. This article will answer the question by
exploring the role that the first four Chief Justices played in securing judicial
power for the new Indonesian Constitutional Court.
This article argues that judicial leadership is the main contributing
factor explaining the emergence of judicial power in Indonesia because of
the Court’s inability to rely on the government to build the institution. In the
case of a new democracy like Indonesia, the government often creates the
Court for the purpose of safeguarding its own interests rather than to
safeguard constitutional principles.4 Moreover, the government may not
want the Court to become an institution capable of exercising robust judicial
review out of fear that it could threaten the government’s authority. Under
such circumstances, the responsibility to build the Court into a functioning
institution lies largely in the hands of the Chief Justice. This article argues
that until the Court has established a solid judicial tradition, it must be
dependent on the creativity of the Chief Justices to define and shape its
judicial power. The first members of the Constitutional Court began their
term with no point of reference regarding judicial review. In the absence of
the tradition of judicial review, the Chief Justice had an important role in
leading the Court to define the scope of its judicial power.
Third, although this article focuses on the role of judicial leadership, it
also implicates the study of institutional design. One of the important
features of judicial design is the term limit. The term limit is a key
component of judicial independence. Longer appointment terms encourage
judges to exercise their authority with more independence. 5 Limiting the
term length to two and a half years is a weakness in the Indonesian
Constitutional Court design. With this limited amount of time, executives
and lawmakers have the opportunity to dismiss any sitting judges who run
against their specific interest and to appoint their favorite judges.

4
See GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES supra note 2; Lee Epstein & Jack Knight,
Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 196 (2003); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007);
JODI S. FINKEL, JUDICIAL REFORM AS POLITICAL INSURANCE: ARGENTINA, PERU, AND MEXICO IN THE
1990S (2008).
5
Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 49, 65 (2002) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Economic Analysis].
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This article further contends that the Court needs not only a good
structural design, but also a Chief Justice who has the vision and courage to
lead the Court in playing an important role in constitutional politics. The
structural design of the Constitutional Court is an important factor that can
strengthen judicial power.6 Similar to Constitutional Courts in other
countries, the Indonesian Constitutional Court is armed with abstract review
that enables it to rule on the conformity of a statute with the Indonesian
Constitution.7 In other words, the Constitutional Court may scrutinize
policy decisions made by the government. Nevertheless, the initial members
of the Court did not have any reference on how the Court could scrutinize
policy decisions. The Court needs a visionary and courageous Chief Justice
who can lead the Court in fulfilling this role and building precedent for
future Constitutional Court justices. Thus, while the analysis on institutional
design is not intended as the primary contribution of this article, the analysis
on the role of Chief Justice has some implications for the study of
institutional design.
The final point of clarification is that this article is not meant to
suggest that in order to bolster its power, courts in a new democracy ought to
have a “Super Chief Justice.”8 This article makes no claim that the
experience of the Indonesian Constitutional Court can be a model for the
development of judicial institutions in various countries. The purpose of this
article is rather to explain how judicial empowerment can be achieved in the
context of Indonesian Constitutional politics. Thus, the exploration of
judicial empowerment through the lens of judicial leadership is meant to be
descriptive rather than normative. This article merely seeks to understand
how the judicial power might be formed in post-authoritarian Indonesia. As
6
For a full discussion of the historical origins of the constitutional courts, see generally ALEC
STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1992); Klaus von Boyme, The Genesis of Constitutional Review in Parliamentary Systems,
in CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 21 (Christine Landfried
ed., 1988); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 3–29 (2d ed. 1997); Stanley L. Paulson, Constitutional Review in the United States and Austria:
Notes on the Beginnings, 16 RATIO JURIS. 223 (2003).
7
For detailed analysis of the concept of abstract review, see STONE, supra note 6; Victor Ferreres
Comella, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some Thoughts on
Judicial Activism, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (2004); WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2005);
Alec Stone Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 69
(2007).
8
For the analysis on the role of judicial leadership in understanding the nature of judicial politics in
Asia, see Haig Patapan, Leadership, Law and Legitimacy: Reflections on the Changing Nature of Judicial
Politics in Asia, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 219 (Björn Dressel ed., 2012).
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a court in a new democracy, the Indonesian Constitutional Court faces the
risk of a counter attack from the executive and legislative branches
whenever they are dissatisfied with the Court’s decision. The Court,
however, has no army that can provide protection from a potential attack.
Consequently, it needs a “heroic” Chief Justice who can lead the institution
to deal with the challenges and pressures from the executive and legislative
branches.
In sum, this article posits that the newly established Indonesian
Constitutional Court needed a strong and skilled Chief Justice to build the
institution, as it had insufficient support from political actors. Moreover, as
it lacked a well-established tradition of judicial review, it needed a visionary
leader who could maximize the structural advantage of the Court. It needed
a heroic leader able to deal with the challenges and pressures from the
government. Finally, the Court required a skilled Chief Justice who could
navigate the Court through the stormy waters of constitutional politics.
This article proceeds in five parts. Following the Introduction, Part II
provides the conceptual stage by presenting evidence of the role of Chief
Justice in the judicial empowerment process in different countries. The
importance of Chief Justices can be seen in the courts of new democracies.
Judicial leadership assumes particular significance as the country continues
in its democratic transition period. For example, the democratic transition
process in Eastern Europe witnessed the rise of two towering figures, Chief
Justice Lazlo Solyom of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and Chief
Justice Valery Zorkin of the Russian Constitutional Court. In both cases,
these Chief Justices emerged as political actors in fragmented political
worlds. Both of them, however, ended their terms with a disastrous exit
after elected political leaders attempted to silence their opposition. In a
different context, Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson of the Constitutional
Court of South Africa proved to be a crucial figure in the democratic
transition process. Unlike the two Chief Justices from Eastern Europe, Chief
Justice Chaskalson was able to survive a decade of his tenure without
triggering debilitating attacks on his Court.
Part IV explores the role that the first Indonesian Chief Justice, Jimly
Asshiddiqie, played in securing judicial power for the new Indonesian
Constitutional Court. Chief Justice Asshiddiqie was indeed strategic in his
role as he sought to increase the Court’s policy-making influence. He
maintained the Court’s institutional position vis-a-vis other branches of
government. Asshiddiqie was conscientious when choosing to engage in
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confrontation with the government and when to backtrack if the issue
became too sensitive. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice’s term limit made his
position vulnerable. Asshiddiqie, along with the Executive, was ousted by
the associate justices of his own Court.
Part V explains the direction adopted by Asshiddiqie’s successor,
Chief Justice Mohammad Mahfud. Chief Justice Mahfud came to the Court
with a vision of strong judicial restraint and promised to employ a more
modest leadership style than his predecessor. Nevertheless, after Mahfud
began in his position, he did not remain faithful to his vow of judicial
restraint. It is true that the Mahfud Court was keen to defer to the executive
and legislative branches in the area of individual rights, but he also sought to
maintain the Court’s status as a key policymaker by reviewing many
governmental policies. Moreover, Chief Justice Mahfud continued to
strengthen the Chief Justice’s power by expanding its extrajudicial activities
through giving media interviews and public statements on social and
political issues. As a strategic judge, Chief Justice Mahfud managed to
avoid backlash from the other branches of government and his own associate
justices. Nevertheless, his own political ambition led to his early departure
from the Court, as he aimed to occupy the office of the President.
Part VI shows the damage that was caused by the dismissal of Chief
Justice Akil Mochtar. Having only spent six months in office, Akil Mochtar
was arrested by the Anti-Corruption Commission for alleged bribery. The
arrest of Akil Mochtar unraveled the hard work of his predecessors to build
the Court as a functioning and transparent institution. Mochtar’s corruption
immediately flipped public perception and insinuated that the Court was
merely another corrupt legal institution in the country.
Part VII considers the performance of Chief Justice Hamdan Zoelva in
his short tenure in the position. Chief Justice Zoelva only stayed in office
for a little over a year. During his brief tenure, Chief Justice Zoelva
continuously led the Court to advocate for judicial restraint. Under Zoelva’s
leadership, the Court did not show any interest in engaging in judicial review
of strategic and politically sensitive cases. Zoelva’s advocacy of judicial
restraint, however, did not guarantee him a second term. Zoelva had to
leave the Court as President Joko Widodo decided not to reappoint him for a
second term.
This article concludes by suggesting that the leadership of the Chief
Justice holds a crucial role in the Indonesian constitutional constellation.
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Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie set a high bar by playing the role of a heroic
Chief Justice. While his successor, Mohammad Mahfud came with a vision
of judicial restraint, he immediately followed the steps of his predecessor.
The departure of both Asshiddiqie and Mahfud marked the end an era of
heroic Chief Justices. Both Chief Justice Akil Mochtar and Hamdan Zoelva
could not maintain the role of the heroic Chief Justice. The Court’s
structural design consistently requires the Court to deal with constitutional
issues that have a powerful impact in the political realm. Consequently, the
Court requires heroic leadership of a Chief Justice who can lead the
institution in challenging areas involving politically sensitive issues.
II.

THE ROLE OF CHIEF JUSTICE IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVES

While currently there are few legal scholars and political scientists
attempting to explain the judicial empowerment from the perspective of the
judicial leadership, we can find evidence on the role of Chief Justice as part
of the larger theme of the study of judicial institutions. One major piece of
scholarly work on the role of judicial leadership is the research from Jennifer
Widner on the emerging constitutionalism in southern and eastern Africa. 9
In her study, Widner explores the question of how judges engaged in
institution building. She particularly focuses on one man, Francis Nyalali,
the former Chief Justice of Tanzania (1976–1999).
Widner explains the influence of Nyalali as an institutional builder
and social engineer through his direct and strategic engagement with
politicians and other public officials rather than through doctrinal activism.
For example, Nyalali spent much time lobbying for judicial independence
and democratic reform at every level. One of his major accomplishments
was the adoption of a code of judicial conduct modeled after the American
Bar Association (ABA) Code of Judicial Conduct.10 As part of his
extrajudicial activism, Nyalali attempted to educate members of the legal
profession on matters of constitutional interpretation. 11 With the media,
Nyalali built mutual collaboration, periodically contributing columns on
legal issues for newspapers and participating in other law-related educational

9
JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALALI AND THE ROAD TO
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA (2001).
10
Id. at 279.
11
Id. at 314.
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initiatives on the radio and television. 12 Moreover, Nyalali built close
connections with international donors to increase material resources for the
judiciary. 13
Kim Lane Scheppele has conducted substantial research on the role of
the Chief Justice in new democracies. 14 Scheppele focused her research on
two of the first Chief Justices of Constitutional Courts in Eastern Europe:
Laszlo Solyom of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and Valerii Zorkin of
the Russian Constitutional Court.
Schepelle explained that both Solyom and Zorkin emerged as leaders
who led the Courts to fight against the executive power. Neither was shy to
challenge their governments for failures to follow the constitutional
principles such as the right to life and the right to human dignity. In both
countries, politicians were unhappy with Chief Justices’ behavior and
successfully pushed the outspoken Chief Justices out of their office.
Nevertheless, both of them were resilient and came back triumphantly to the
political arena after spending a few years in the political wilderness.15
It is worth briefly exploring Scheppelle’s analysis on the role of Chief
Justice Solyom in the early period of the Hungary Constitutional Court.
Solyom was formally elected by his fellow justices as the Chief Justice of
the Constitutional Court in the summer of 1990.16 During his tenure as
Chief Justice, Solyom made constitutional promulgations such as the notion
of the “invisible constitution.”17 For instance, the right to life and to human
dignity can be found in Article 54(1) of the 1990 Constitution.
Nevertheless, under the notion of the “invisible constitution,” Chief Justice
Solyom explained that these rights are foundational principles of Hungarian
constitutional law and therefore it would exist even without a reference in
the constitutional text. In the Capital Punishment Case, Solyom described
the decision’s reliance on the right to human dignity as a utilization of the

12

Id. at 322.
Id. at 394–95.
14
See Kim Lane Scheppele, Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the
Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1757 (2006).
15
Id. at 1758.
16
Id. at 1776.
17
Id. at 1777.
13
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“‘invisible constitution’—[which is] beyond the [control of both the]
Constitution, which is often amended . . . [, and] future constitution.” 18
Under Solyom’s leadership, the Court also struck down many laws
related to economic issues such as property rights, entrepreneurship,
contracts, and social security benefits. A telling example is when the
Hungarian government passed a severe austerity budget that aimed to cut
social safety-net programs. The Court declared that the government’s
economic plan violated the principle of legal security in the Constitution
because it did not give the citizens adequate time to adjust themselves to the
welfare cuts.19
After the Court’s decision on the social welfare package, the
Government signaled that it could weaken the Court through its intervention
in the selection process of the Constitutional Court justices. The
Constitutional Court justices were elected to a nine-year term in office and
the majority of them, including Chief Justice Solyom, had been elected in
1989 or 1990. With the end of their nine-year terms approaching, the
question arose as to whether the activist justices’ terms would be renewed.
When Chief Justice Solyom’s term ended in November 1998, the
government and parliament decided not to renew his term. Consequently he
left the Court and briefly disappeared from public life. 20
Scheppele argues that there are at least two factors that could
facilitate the rise of a maverick Chief Justice like Laszlo Solyom. The first
factor involves the Constitutional Courts, as they have a particular function
of judicial review that is to review the constitutionality of laws and
18
See Alkotmánybírósága (AB) [Constitutional Court] Oct. 31, 1990, 23/1990 (Hung.) (on capital
punishment). For discussion of the development of the idea of “invisible constitution” in Hungarian case
law, see Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary’s Transition from Communism to Democracy:
The Constitutional Court, the Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition of Property Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 41, 78–81 (1992).
19
See Alkotmánybírósága (AB) [Constitutional Court] Jun. 30 1995, 43/1995, MK.56/1995 (Hung.)
(on social security benefits). The government was angry with the Court’s decisions and it threatened to
slash the Court’s authority. Justice Solyom, however, went to the media and explained that the Court had
to guard the Constitution from political assaults, and the Court had to be aggressive because the
constitutional rights of citizens had been threatened by the politicians. See Scheppelle, supra note 14, at
1783.
20
Scheppelle, supra note 14, at 1785. Solyom took up a guest professorship at the University of
Cologne but later returned to Budapest to teach at the new private Catholic law school, Peter Pazmany
University. Nevertheless, Solyom remained popular in the public mind and when the term of the
Hungarian President was up in the summer of 2005, Solyom ran for presidential election and was elected
by the parliament as the Hungarian President. He took office on August 5, 2005 and finished his term as
President in August 2010.
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governmental decisions and actions. 21 Consequently, the Chief Justice of
the Constitutional Court would always be in the midst of political
controversy because the Court has to constantly review governmental
policies and actions.22 Second, unlike the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court who has a role as the top administrator of the U.S. federal court
system, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court has no administrative
relations to other courts. As a result, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional
Court has enormous control over its own institution and the Chief Justice
can be a public personification of the Constitutional Court. 23
In her article, Schepple compares Chief Justice Loszlo Solyom to Chief
Justice Valery Zorkin, the first Chief Justice of the Russian Constitutional
Court. In his early tenure (1991–1993), Chief Justice Zorkin led the Court to
become a powerful political actor by taking virtually every politically
sensitive case concerning issues of jurisdiction and competencies both
within and between branches of the federal government. 24 Overall, the
Zorkin Court favored accepting political challenges filed by political actors
over civil rights challenges filed by individual citizens. 25 This approach
provided incentive to the Court to involve itself in policy disputes and to
assert the Court’s authority as the arbiter of political disputes.
Chief Justice Zorkin began his fall from power when he became
involved in the major political dispute between the executive and the
legislatures. Initially, Chief Justice Zorkin attempted to play the role as a
broker of a political compromise between President Yeltsin and Supreme
Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov.26 Chief Justice Zorkin, however, went
further to enter the political brawls when he sided with Khasbulatov against
Yeltsin’s proposed referendum on the constitution. Zorkin gave a speech to
the Supreme Soviet and argued that the referendum should be postponed.27
Zorkin suffered significant humiliation when other members of the Court
21
22
23
24

Id. at 1762–63.
Id. at 1764.
Id. at 1766.
See CARLA THORSON, POLITICS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 55

(2012).
25

Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 105–06.
27
Id. at 106–08. After the legislatures rejected his constitutional referendum proposal, President
Yeltsin retaliated by announcing a decree by which he would assume total responsibility for the conduct of
affairs in Russia. Zorkin joined Khasbulatov to denounce the speech and moreover, Zorkin convened an
emergency session of the Constitutional Court to evaluate the constitutionality of President Yeltsin’s
speech without waiting for a formal petition.
26
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rebelled against his political endeavors. Many other justices did not agree
with Zorkin’s initiative to bring the Court into a highly politically sensitive
issue and they demanded Zorkin resign from his position as Chief Justice.28
With his brethren in contempt against him, Zorkin stepped down as the
Chief Justice and President Yeltsin issued a decree that suspended the
Constitutional Court.
Thorson posits that the easiest explanation of Chief Justice Zorkin’s
tragic fall is that he did precisely what a judge should not do; he failed to
avoid a politically sensitive issue or maintain neutrality. 29 Instead, Zorkin
chose to engage in extra-judicial behavior that went beyond his duty as
Chief Justice. He became increasingly outspoken on issues related to the
distribution of power and engaged in extra-judicial behavior that went
beyond constitutional interpretation. Moreover, he involved the Court in
“political sensitive questions,” which was far from its business.30
The new Russian Constitutional Court reopened on January 1, 1994
with a new Chief Justice, new rules regarding the behavior of justices, and
new procedures for handling petitions.31 The new Chief Justice Vladimir
Tumanov engaged in a different strategy by avoiding high-profile
jurisdictional disputes. The Tumanov Court focused on civil rights issues
and federalism questions raised by the republic and its regions.32 Chief
Justice Tumanov reached the mandatory retirement age in 1997 and was
succeeded by Marat Baglai. Chief Justice Baglai continued Tumanov’s
strategy of keeping the Court out of the public eye by avoiding politically
sensitive cases. 33
As mentioned above, the analysis on the judicial leadership has
implications on the study of institutional design. In the case of the Russian
Constitutional Court, the role of Chief Justice is closely related to the
Court’s design on term limits. When Vladimir Putin became President in
2000, he moved to change the term limit of judges in order to protect the
pro-executive judges like Chief Justice Baglai who would reach mandatory
28

Scheppelle, supra note 14, at 1832.
THORSON, supra note 24, at 101.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 119. The reasons for the Court’s survival are not entirely clear, but Carla Thorson provides
some explanation on the effort of some politician to convince President Yeltsin that the court ought to
continue.
32
Id. at 121.
33
Id. at 145.
29
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retirement age of seventy in 2001. President Putin proposed to remove the
mandatory retirement age and extend the judicial tenure from twelve to
fifteen years. 34 While President Putin initially attempted to protect his
friends, his political strategy was counterproductive. Chief Justice Baglai
lost re-election in 2003 as his brethren began to see that Putin favored him.
In a dramatic turn, Valerii Zorkin was reelected by his colleagues as Chief
Justice to replace Baglai, and has remained the Chief Justice for more than
ten years. Based on the current constitutional court procedures—there is no
term limit or mandatory retirement age for the Chief Justice—Zorkin will
remain in his post for a long time. 35
The role of judicial leadership can also be traced in the work of
Theunis Roux on the Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCSA).36
Roux’s book primarily focuses on the contextual factors that constrained the
Constitutional Court’s exercise of its judicial power. His work explores the
political context of judicial review in South Africa from 1995 to 2005, which
was under the leadership of Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson. Although
Roux’s work focuses primarily on the theory of contextual factors that
constrained the Court in exercising judicial review, one can still trace the
role of Chief Justice Chaskalson in shaping the judicial empowerment of the
CCSA. 37
Roux traced the journey of Chaskalson back to the Apartheid era
when Chaskalson sublimated his opposition to Apartheid into his role as a
human rights lawyer. 38 Chaskalson built a powerful litigation firm, the
Legal Resources Center (LRC) with a vision of the common law as the
repository of principles of freedom and justice that could be used by activist
34
Id. at 147. President Putin’s proposal was approved at the end of 2000 but was modified by the
State Duma so that these new tenure rules would apply only to judges appointed after 1994. In 2001, Putin
introduced another reform that restores the mandatory retirement age of 70 (beginning in January 2005) to
all those justices appointed after 1994.
35
The Law provides that the term of the office of the Judge of the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation shall be indefinite. The age limit for the office of the Judge of the Constitutional Court
of the Russian Federation shall be seventy years. The age limit for the office of the Judge, however, shall
not apply to the President of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. See Federal’nyi
Konstitutsionnyi Zakon o Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Federal Constitutional Law on the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1994, No. 13, Item 1447.
36
See THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT, 1995–2005 (2013).
37
See id. In his book, Roux focuses on three major elements that the Court should consider in
exercising its powers of judicial review: the Court’s capacity to decide cases according to acceptable
reasoning; support from the general public; and the Court’s capacity to resist attacks on its independence.
38
Id. at 221–22.
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lawyers to protect individual rights against state encroachment. 39 In June
1994, President Nelson Mandela appointed Arthur Chaskalson as the
President of the Constitutional Court where he remained until his retirement
in 2005.
Ronald Dworkin had high praise for Chaskalson’s leadership,
especially in his role as the Chief Justice in leading the Court during the
democratic transition period. Dworkin said:
Since apartheid’s end, Chaskalson has rendered what is
probably an even more important service to his country. Under
his intellectual and administrative leadership, the Constitutional
Court has already become one of the most influential such
courts in the world. The quality of its craftsmanship and the
disciplined imagination with which it has interpreted South
Africa’s admirable Constitution has helped to ensure a
remarkably smooth transition from oppression to a democratic
rule of both and law and principle . . . . 40
Roux believes Dworkin’s remarks present a causal link between the way the
Court responded to its judicial mandate and South Africa’s relatively
peaceful transition to democracy. 41 Roux argues that Dworkin’s summary
of Chaskalson’s leadership must be interpreted in light of the Court’s
strategy on socio-economic rights, in that the judges were able to assert their
institutional function in the post-apartheid era.42 The Court’s approach to
socio-economic rights contributes to democratic consolidation by subjecting
majority rule to constitutional restraints.43
39
Id. at 222. Justice Chaskalson founded LRC as South Africa’s first public interest law firm to
fight apartheid, modeling it after the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. Financing came
largely from three American sources: the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund. See also MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH
AFRICA AND UNITED STATES 32–33 (2009); Douglas Martin, Arthur Chaskalson, Chief South African
Jurist, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/africa/arthurchaskalson-south-african-chief-justice-dies-at-81.html?_r=0.
40
Ronald Dworkin, Response to Overseas Commentators, 1 INT’L. J CONST. L. 651, 651–52 (2003).
41
ROUX, supra note 36, at 41.
42
Id. at 42.
43
For the scholarship of the Court’s strategy in the area of socio-economic rights see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001); Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating
Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321 (2007); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1895 (2004); Eric C. Christiansen, Using Constitutional Adjudication to Remedy SocioEconomic Injustice: Comparative Lesson from South Africa, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 369 (2008);
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Roux praises the Constitutional Court of South Africa as one of the
most successful of the post-Cold War constitutional courts. Roux believes
the Chaskalson Court’s ability to survive until May of 2005 without any
debilitating attacks on its independence is a remarkable achievement. 44 In
his book, Roux explains that there are several factors that led to the survival
of the Chaskalson Court, but one of the key successes of the Chaskalson
Court lay in its ability to find the balance between its role as a forum to
bridge over the competing political forces and its consistent support for a
range of constitutional rights. 45
Chief Justice Chaskalson was a strategic Chief Justice who knew how
to enhance the Court’s authority by engaging in rights-based discourse while
also fortifying the Court’s status by playing a minimalist role in some policy
areas. Chief Justice Chaskalson described his minimalist strategy as
follows:
I think in the early days it’s appropriate not to decide more than
you have to decide . . . . To that extent, then, the Court has
indicated that it will endeavor not to decide more than it has to
and that constitutional issue ought not to be raised if the matter
can dealt with on other legal grounds.46
Nevertheless, he took a maximalist view on socio-economic rights. He
stated that “the socio economic rights are entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
Unless the courts resort to stratagem of declaring disputes concerning socio
economic rights to be political questions and for that reason decline
jurisdiction, they must confront and decide the hard cases that arise . . . .”47
Thus, the Chaskalson Court was able to play an effective role in South
African politics by playing a combination of minimalist and maximalist
strategy.

Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-Economic Rights as
“Insurance Swaps” 1–29 (U. Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 436, 2013); KATHARINE
G. YOUNG CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012).
44
ROUX, supra note 36, at 188.
45
Id. at 36.
46
Kate Kempton & Malcolm MacLaren, The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A
Conversation with Justice Arthur Chaskalson, President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 56 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 161, 170 (1998).
47
Arthur Chaskalson, From Wickedness to Equality: The Moral Transformation of South African
Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 590, 604 (2003).
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Ran Hirschl, in his seminal work Constitutional Theocracy, also
includes an analysis on the importance of the Chief Justice’s position in the
context of political control of constitutional courts and judges. 48 Hirschl’s
analysis ranges from the Chief Justice Maher Abdul Wahed of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt to Chief Justice Aharon Barak of the Supreme
Court of Israel.49 Haig Patapan also dedicated a small fraction of his
scholarship on the rule of the Chief Justices in understanding the nature of
judicial politics in Asia. 50 Some scholars have posited Chief Justice Ifthikar
Muhammad Chaudhry of Pakistan as the exemplar of courage and bravery
when he stood up against the military headed executive, General
Musharraf.51 Chaudhry’s suspension and house arrest then led to an
unprecedented revolt led by Pakistani lawyers in support of judicial
independence. 52 Thus, Chaudhry’s heroic leadership is one of the most
striking examples of how the actions of an individual Chief Justice can have
major implications.
The experiences of Chief Justices from different countries provide
important data that judicial leadership is an important factor for
understanding the nature of judicial politics. Moreover, the institutional
design, including term limits and the general political landscape are factors
that heavily influence the nature and extent of the judicial strategy that
individual Chief Justices choose to employ.
III.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT

In order to better understand the role of the Chief Justice in the
Indonesian Constitutional Court, this part presents a brief survey of the
Court’s history. Historically, the Indonesian legal system is based on the
civil law tradition of the Netherlands, under which a judge cannot invalidate
a statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Within the civil law
48

See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 85–95 (2010).
See id.
50
Patapan, supra note 8, at 3.
51
See Charles Kennedy, The Judicialization of Politics in Pakistan, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF
POLITICS IN ASIA (Bjorn Dressel ed., 2012); Taiyyaba Ahmed Qureshi, State of Emergency: General
Pervez Musharraf’s Executive Assault on Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 35 N.C.J. INT’L. L. & COM.
REG. 485 (2010); Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in
Pakistan Under Musharraf, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985 (2010)
52
For further discussion on the “Lawyers’ Movement” in Pakistan, see Moeen H. Cheema, The
“Chaudhry Court”: Deconstructing the “Judicialization of Politics” in Pakistan, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 448,
450–55.
49

JUNE 2016

Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia

504

tradition, Acts of Parliament are the supreme expression of the democratic
will and consequently courts may not challenge them. Nevertheless, the
Indonesian Supreme Court could review government regulations on the
grounds that they violated Acts of Parliament. 53 But the judiciary was too
weak to exercise even the limited power it had.54
One of the major factors that contributed to the Supreme Court’s
inability to use its limited judicial review authority was the executive’s
control of and interference in the courts. After the New Order military
government under the leadership of General Soeharto came to power in
1966, the executive branch moved to control the judiciary. The 1970
Judiciary Law gave the Government tight control of the organizational,
administrative, and financial aspects of the judiciary. 55 The Government
then used this control over court administration to pressure judges into
bowing to the interests of the government. After some time, the Court itself
moved into voluntary compliance in order to prove its loyalty to the
Government. 56
For more than thirty-two years, Indonesia was under the authoritarian
rule of General Soeharto’s military regime. By 1998, General Soeharto was
aging and ailing, but he gave no indication that he intended to step down in
the near future. In March of 1998, he was sworn in as President for his
seventh five-year term, and appointed his most trusted lieutenant, B.J.
Habibie, as his vice president.57 Soeharto’s seventh term in office lasted
only two months. He was forced to resign due to mounting popular unrest
and a collapsed economy that he was unable to revive. After Soeharto
tendered his resignation on May 21, 1998, Habibie was sworn in as the new
President on the same day. His presidency marked the beginning of a new
era called Reformasi (Reform).
Reformasi brought new hope for
institutional change, including opportunities to establish an independent
53

Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 14 of 1970 on the Basic Principles of the Judiciary.
For detailed information about the performance of the Indonesian Supreme Court, see
SEBASTIAAN POMPE, THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT: A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (2005).
55
See id. at 111–29.
56
See id. at 124–29.
57
See ADAM SCHWARZ, A NATION IN WAITING: INDONESIA’S SEARCH FOR STABILITY (2000). Prior
to his appointment, Habibie had held the post of Minister of Research and Technology for twenty years. Id.
at 71. During his tenure as technology czar, Habibie presided over the many strategic government projects,
ranging from aircraft manufacturing to satellite technology. Id. In the early 1990s, Soeharto extended a
mandate to Habibie to become more active in political arenas. He became the Chairperson of the
Association of Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), a new
center of politico-bureaucratic power within the government. Id. at 85–86.
54
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parliamentary elections in June of 1999.
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Habibie's administration held

Following the parliamentary elections, the People’s Consultative
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) held a general
assembly to elect a new President. Habibie, however, did not receive
sufficient support to run as their next presidential candidate, and
consequently had to withdraw his bid to recapture the presidency. 59 The
Assembly instead elected Abdurrahman Wahid, who was supported by the
Islamist political bloc, Central Axis, as the next President.60 Wahid was the
long-time religious leader of a Muslim organization known as Nahdatul
Ulama.
The General Session of the Assembly (MPR) was also the first
opportunity for politicians to address the issue of constitutional reform,
including the power of judicial review, in the new government. 61 The First
General Assembly Session in 1999, and the following Session in 2000,
however, failed to reach consensus on the establishment of a constitutional
court with judicial review authority. It was not until President Wahid’s
impeachment in July 2001 that politicians began to seriously consider the
importance of the Constitutional Court.
Less than two years after the politicians elected Wahid as President,
they impeached him based on the allegation that his aide used his name to
illegally secure US 4,000,000 worth of funds from the State Logistics
Agency. Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced the impeached
President Wahid. Fearing she would be subject to the same fate as Wahid,

58
See Benny K. Harman, Perkembangan Pemikiran Mengenai Perlunya Pengujian UU Terhadap
UUD Dalam Sejarah Ketatanegaraan Indonesia, 1945–2004 [The Development of Legal Thought on the
Judicial Review of Act Parliament Against the Constitution in the Indonesian Constitutional History, 1945–
2004] (May 20, 2006) (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Indonesia) (on file with author).
59
BACHARUDDIN JUSUF HABIBIE, DECISIVE MOMENTS: INDONESIA’S LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY
428 (2006).
60
See YANG RAZALI KASSIM, TRANSITION POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DYNAMICS OF LEADERSHIP
CHANGE AND SUCCESSION IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA 146 (2005).
61
For a detailed discussion of the Constitutional Reform process, see SIMON BUTT & TIM LINDSEY,
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDONESIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2012); DENNY INDRAYANA, INDONESIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 1999–2002: AN EVALUATION OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TRANSITION
(2008); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA (2013).
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Megawati proposed the creation of the Constitutional Court that could
review impeachment motions against a sitting President. 62
While acknowledging that the Wahid impeachment was an important
trigger for the establishment of the Constitutional Court, many scholars have
dismissed the impeachment as the sole reason behind the creation of the
Court, but rather there were many factors at play. 63 Instead of dismissing
Wahid’s impeachment, this article would like to make a distinction between
proximate and ultimate causation of the creation of the Court. Such
distinction will lead us to a better understanding of the establishment of the
Constitutional Court.
This article argues that President Wahid’s
impeachment was the proximate cause of the establishment of the
Constitutional Court. From a historical and political perspective, one of the
ultimate causes of the establishment of the constitutional court was the
culmination of the consistent demand made by lawyers, scholars, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the long absence of judicial review
in Indonesia.64
In the early days of Soeharto’s New Order regime, the Judges
Association and the government fought bitterly over the issue of judicial
power and constitutional review. Nevertheless, the Judges Association stood
alone and did not have sufficient support to bring about such reform. In the
end the judges and their supporters lost.65 Fast forward to the period after
the fall of New Order regime, the activists and NGOs under the banner of
Koalisi Ornop untuk Konstitusi Baru (NGOs Coalition for a New
Constitution), proposed the establishment a Constitutional Commission,
with some hope that the Commission will adopt judicial review. 66 The
NGOs Coalition came out with several proposals on the establishment of an
independent constitutional commission during the Assembly annual session
in November 2001 including that members of the commission shall be

62

See Stefanus Hendrianto, Institutional Choice and the New Indonesian Constitutional Court, in
NEW COURTS IN ASIA 158, 162 (Andrew Harding & Penelope (Pip) Nicholson eds., 2010).
63
Tim Lindsey, Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy, 6 SING. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 244, 260–61 (2002). See also Harman, supra note 58; SIMON BUTT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA (2015).
64
Lindsey, supra note 63, at 261–66.
65
See POMPE, supra note 54, at 213.
66
Lindsey, supra note 63, at 266. The Coalition comprises of 17 NGOs, including the Center for
Electoral Reform, the Independent Election Monitoring Committee, Indonesian Corruption Watch, the
Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association, and the Indonesian Forum for the Environment.
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democratically elected, and shall consist of independent civilians from all
provinces, social groups, and experts.67
It was true that judges, lawyers, and NGOs had long pushed for
judicial independence and judicial review. Nevertheless, civil society
elements did not play a significant role in the creation of the Constitutional
Court. During the constitutional reform process, the Assembly (MPR),
however, rejected the proposal of the Constitutional Commission and
decided that its Working Body should be responsible for preparing
amendments.68 Thus, the civil society represented by NGOs had no direct
input on the amendment process in the Assembly (MPR) at all.
On November 9, 2001, the Third General Assembly Session voted in
favor of a constitutional amendment that created the Indonesian
Constitutional Court and endowed it with the authority to review
impeachment motions against the President and/or Vice President.69
Moreover, the constitutional amendment also equipped the new Court with
the authority to review the constitutionality of statutes, to resolve disputes
over the powers of state institutions, to review a petition for dissolution of a
political party, and to resolve electoral disputes.70
It is important to note that the constitutional amendment provides that
“[t]he judicial power shall be implemented by a Supreme Court and judicial
bodies underneath it in the form of public courts, religious affairs courts,
military tribunals, and state administrative courts, and by a Constitutional
Court.”71 Essentially, the amendment divides the judiciary, in a broad sense,
into two parts: the “Supreme Court” and the “Constitutional Court.” This
model assigns different tasks to each body: it assigns the Supreme Court the
power of ordinary judicial functions to decide concrete cases in civil,
criminal, and administrative matters, while it entrusts the Constitutional
Court with the specific “constitutional function,” of reviewing the validity of
legislation.

67
See Andrew Ellis, The Indonesian Constitutional Transition: Conservatism or Fundamental
Change?, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 116, 143 (2002).
68
DENNY INDRAYANA, INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 1999–2002: AN EVALUATION OF
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TRANSITION 170 (2008)
69
Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 7A.
70
Id. arts. 24(C)(1), (2).
71
Id. art. 24(2).
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With regard to judicial review, the Constitution maintains in the
Supreme Court the authority to review ordinances and regulations made
under any statutes.72 At the same time, the Constitution equips the
Constitutional Court with authority to conduct reviews of statutory
legislation. This arrangement means that the right of judicial review is not
uniformly given to a single court. Instead the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court each share different judicial review authority, which
this article refers to as “jurisdictional cohabitation.”
The Constitution mandated that the Government erect the new
Constitutional Court by August 17, 2003 at the latest.73 The Government
and the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR),
however, did not approve the bill establishing the Constitutional Court until
August 6, 2003, which was signed by the President on August 13, 2003.74
Following the approval, the Government, the DPR, and the Supreme Court
(Mahkamah Agung) had to rush to select judges for the Court before the
Court opened its doors on August 18, 2003.
IV.

THE AMBITION, SUCCESS AND FAILURE
MARSHALL, JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE

OF THE

INDONESIAN JOHN

Having explained the historical background of the Constitutional
Court, this article will move to discuss leadership of the first Chief Justice of
the Indonesian Constitutional Court, Jimly Asshiddiqie.
The 2003
Constitutional Court Law provides that the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief
Justice are elected by the Constitutional Court Justices. 75 The Nine
Constitutional Court Justices were sworn in on August 16, 2003. Soon after
their inauguration, the nine Justices held their first meeting to elect the Chief
Justice, and elected Jimly Asshiddiqie as the first Chief Justice. Looking at
Asshiddiqie’s personal background and his rise to the bench helps to explain
why his leadership style played an important role in building the Indonesian
Constitutional Court.

72

See id. art. 24A.
Id. Transitional Provision, art. III of the Fourth Amendment.
74
MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT], MENEGAKKAN
NEGARA HUKUM YANG DEMOKRATIS: CATATAN PERJALANAN TIGA TAHUN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI
2003–2006 [TO BUILD A DEMOCRATIC STATE BASED ON RULE OF LAW: THREE YEARS OF THE INDONESIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: 2003–2006] (2006) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, THREE YEARS OF THE
INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT].
75
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, art. 4(3).
73
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The Rise of Jimly Asshiddiqie: From Academia to Judiciary

Jimly Asshiddiqie received his doctorate in Constitutional Law from
the University of Indonesia. In the early 1990s, he joined Association of
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), which had emerged as a new
political force within the government. The rise of ICMI benefited
Asshiddiqie as the Government appointed him as the Secretary to the
Minister of Education in 1993. Five years later, Vice President Habibie
appointed him as his Assistant for Social Welfare and Poverty Alleviation.76
When Habibe became President, he established the Council for
Restoration of Security and Legal System (Dewan Penegakan Keamanan
dan Sistem Hukum) in his attempt to overcome the political crisis in the
country. 77 Habibie appointed Jimly Asshiddiqie as Secretary for the Council
for Restoration. His primary duties included coordinating Cabinet ministers
and political leaders who sat on the Council. On February 24, 1999, Habibie
assigned Asshiddiqie to another important position as the Coordinator for
Legal and Statutory Reform Team, which reported directly to the
President. 78 There was little doubt that Asshiddiqie played a significant role
in the legal reform process during the Habibie administration.
After his political patron Habibie lost his presidential bid in 1999,
Asshiddiqie went back to academia to teach at the University of Indonesia.
He returned to public service for a brief moment when the People’s
Consultative Assembly (MPR) called him to join an expert team on the
constitutional reform process.79 By the time the government established the
Constitutional Court in 2003, Asshiddiqie had established a reputation as an
expert on constitutional law and a skillful politician. With excellent
credentials, he was one of the top choices to lead the new Constitutional
Court.
The Constitution distributes the appointment power equally among the
three branches of the government.
The President, the House of
76

See ZAENAL ABIDIN E. P. & LISA SUROSO, SETENGAH ABAD JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE: KONSTITUSI
DAN SEMANGAT KEBANGSAAN [FIFTY YEARS OF JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE: CONSTITUTION AND THE SPIRIT OF
NATIONHOOD] (2006).
77

Presidential Decree No. 191 of 1998.
Presidential Decree No. 18 of 1999 (Feb. 24, 1999).
79
Assembly working group blasted over constitutional amendments, JAKARTA POST (Mar. 22,
2001), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2001/03/22/assembly-working-group-blasted-overconstitutional-amendments.html.
78
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Representative, and the Supreme Court all possess authority to appoint the
Constitutional Court Justices.80
In August 2003, the House of
Representatives immediately appointed Jimly Asshiddiqie as a
Constitutional Court justice along with the other two justices, Achmad
Roestandi and I Gede Palguna. 81 The President appointed three justices,
Achmad Natabaya, Abdul Muktie Fadjar, and Harjono (one name only).
The Supreme Court appointed Laica Marzuki, Maruarar Siahaan, and
Soedarsono (one name only) to fill the remaining three spots. None of these
new justices had a public profile like Asshiddiqie. With his stellar
reputation and political experience, Asshidiqie was elected by his colleagues
as the first Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
B.

Jimly Asshiddiqie’s Strategies to Build the Court

Jimly Asshiddiqie transformed the Court from an institution that
lacked both external support and infrastructure into one that is now capable
of standing independent from the other branches of government.
Asshiddiqie’s leadership strategies are important as they suggest the extent
to which his style influenced the Court’s performance. In other words, it
shines light on whether his leadership helped the Court overcome the
challenges and obstacles that prevented the Court from exercising its
authority.
The first obstacle for the Court in exercising its authority was the
statutory limitation imposed by the legislative branch. From the beginning,
politicians in the legislative branch did not have any intention of creating a
Court that could exercise a robust model of judicial review. They endowed
the Court with the authority to review the constitutionality of statutes but not
any governmental ordinances, regulations, or actions.82 Furthermore, they
only allowed the Court to review the constitutionality of statutes that were
enacted after October 19, 1999, the date when the constitutional reform
process began.83 It is now obvious that the politicians designed the Court
with limited authority and the legislature did not want to see the Court play a
prominent role in the Indonesian political scene.
80
Article 24C(3) of the Indonesian Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court shall be
composed of nine justices, in which three shall be nominated by the President, three nominated by the
House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR), and three nominated by the Supreme Court.
Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 24C(3).
81
Government Names Seven Candidates for New Court, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 13, 2003.
82
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, arts. 24(1), 24(2).
83
Id. art. 50.
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The second obstacle for the Court was the lack of governmental
support. When the Court opened on August 19, 2003, it had no funding, no
office, and no support staff. Chief Justice Jimly Asshidiqie frequently stated
that he started the Court with only three pieces of paper: the Constitution,
the Constitutional Court Law, and the Presidential Decree that appointed the
Constitutional Court Justices.84 With no office or infrastructure, the Court
had to use the Chief Justice’s mobile phone as its first contact number. 85 It
was not until January 2004 that the government let the Court use a building
that originally belonged to the Ministry of Communication and Information
as a temporary headquarters. The lack of sufficient governmental support
left the responsibility of building the Court squarely in the Chief Justice’s
hands.
Having reviewed the obstacles that the Court faced in its infancy
period, the following section of this article will address the following
questions: How did Chief Justice Asshiddiqie lead the Court to overcome
this obvious lack of support as well as the many obstacles that beset the
Court in the early days of its operation? How did he build the Court into an
institution with the capacity to stand up against the other branches of
government?
1.

Setting a Doctrinal Foundation for Judicial Review

Chief Justice Asshiddiqie’s first strategy was to remove any statutory
rule that prevented the Court from exercising its authority. This strategy was
primarily aimed at removing Article 50 of the Constitutional Court Law,
which stated that the Court could only review statutes that were enacted after
October 19, 1999. As a constitutional law scholar, Asshiddiqie fully
understood that if the Court could not review longstanding statutes, the
whole existence of the Court would be meaningless. During his nomination
hearing in front of the House Judiciary Committee, he made it clear that

84
Jimly Asshiddiqie, Creating A Constitutional Court for a New Democracy, Lecture at Melbourne
Law School (Mar. 11, 2009). See also Jimly Asshiddiqie, Bermodal tiga lembar kertas [With Three Pieces
of Paper], REPUBLIKA, Jan. 11, 2004.
85
Jimly Asshidiqie, Setahun Mahkamah Konstitusi: Refleksi, Gagasan Dan Penyelenggaraan, Serta
Setangkup Harapan [The First Year of the Constitutional Court: Reflection, Idea, Action and Hope], in
MENJAGA DENYUT KONSTITUSI: REFLEKSI SATU TAHUN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI [KEEPING THE
CONSTITUTION ALIVE: REFLECTION ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] 3, 14
(Refly Harun et al. eds., 2004).
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sooner or later the Court would nullify Article 50 because it was contrary to
the Constitution.86
Indeed, it did not take very long for the Court to decide the
constitutionality of Article 50.87 The opportunity for the Court to review
Article 50 came when it considered the Chamber of Commerce Law Case in
2005. 88 The claimants were members of the Medium and Small Scale
Chambers of Commerce who challenged the constitutionality of the
Chamber of Commerce Law of 1987. Furthermore, the claimants also asked
the Court to review Article 50. The Court moved swiftly in declaring
Article 50 unconstitutional and invalidated it entirely. 89
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie stated that it required great courage for the
newly established Court to invalidate Article 50.90 He explained the Court’s
decision as ijtihad, a term in Islamic law that describes the process of
making a decision by personal effort, independently of any school of thought
of Islamic jurisprudence.91 Moreover, Asshiddiqie said that he drew
inspiration from John Marshall, a former Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court and architect of the historic decision Marbury v. Madison.92
It was in Marbury that the U.S. Supreme Court claimed for itself the power
to judge the constitutionality of statutes. “If John Marshall had courage to
set a cornerstone for judicial review in the American legal history, I can also
do the same thing for my country,” said Asshiddiqie.93

86

Id. at 13.
When the Court decided its first case, it immediately grappled with the jurisdictional limitation
imposed by Article 50. The claimant was a district court judge who challenged the constitutionality of the
1985 Supreme Court Law. The issue was whether the Court could review the law enacted in 1985.
Nevertheless, the Court did not explicitly nullify Article 50, instead deciding “to set aside”
(mengenyampingkan) Article 50. Why did the Court not explicitly nullify it? One plausible answer is
because the claimant did not formally request the Court to do so. The claimant challenged the
constitutionality of the Supreme Court Law, but not the Constitutional Court Law. Decision, Reviewing
Law No. 1 of 1987 on the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, No. 066/PUU-II/2004 (Constitutional
Court, Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_
sidang_eng_Putusan%20066_PUU-II_2004%20(UU%20MKRI).pdf.
88
See id.
89
Id. at 55.
90
JIMLY ASHIDDIQIE, MENEGAKKAN TIANG KONSTITUSI: MEMOAR LIMA TAHUN KEPEMIMPINAN:
JIMLY ASHIDDIQIE PROF. DR. J, S.H. DI KAHNAMAH KONSTITUSI (2003–2008) [MEMOIR OF FIVE YEARS OF
LEADERSHIP] 165 (2008).
91
Id.
92
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
93
Interview with Jimly Asshiddiqie, Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, in Jakarta,
Indon. (July 31, 2006) (translated to English by author).
87
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The Court as a Forum to Review Social, Economic and Political
Issues

Initially, the politicians created the Court with limited authority.
Hence, they never imagined a Court that would review many statutory
regulations, touching on social and economic issues, and implicating the
protection of fundamental rights. The driving force behind this surprising
result was, indeed, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie.
Asshiddiqie believed that in a country experiencing economic and
political transition like Indonesia, there should be a program for economic
and political reform. Moreover, he believed that the Court could contribute
to the economic and political reform process, 94 particularly by reviewing
governmental policies. 95 Based on this belief, Asshiddiqie moved to expand
the Court’s limited authority, thus endowing it with the tools to scrutinize
political decisions made by the executive and legislative branches.
The Court’s decision in the Electricity Law Case is an example of
how the Court reviewed economic policy. 96 The center of dispute in this
case was the Electricity Law, which allowed the involvement of private
enterprises in the electricity industry. 97 The Court ruled that electricity was
an important sector for the country because it constituted a common good.98
The Court further held that “it is only the state-owned enterprises that can
manage the electricity industry.” 99 The Court decided to strike down the

94
ROFIQUL-UMAM DKK., KONSTITUSI DAN KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA KONTEMPORER:
PEMIKIRAN JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE DAN PARA PAKAR HUKUM [CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA: THE THOUGHTS OF JIMLY ASSHIDDIQIE AND OTHERS] 39 (Rofiqul-Umam
Ahmad et al., eds. 2007).
95
See Oral Argument, Reviewing Law No. 30 of 2002 on the Anti-Corruption Commission Law,
Nos. 012/PUU-IV/2006, 016/PUU-IV/2006, 019/PUU-IV/2006 (Constitutional Court, Nov. 21, 2006),
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_PUTUSN
%20%20KPK%20%20%20(012-016-019)%20-%20Eng.pdf.
96
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 20 of 2000 on Electrical Power, No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 15, 2004) [hereinafter the Electricity Law Case]. An English translation of the
case is available at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_
sidang_eng_Putusan%20001-021-022_PUU-I_2003%20(UU%20Ketenagalistrikan)%20
%20English.doc.pdf
97
See Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 20 of 2002 on Electrical Power.
98
Electricity Law Case, supra note 96, at 345. The Court used the term “hajat hidup orang banyak,”
which I translated loosely to the common good.
99
Id. at 348.
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entire statute because the involvement of private enterprises in electricity
industry was contrary to the economic clause of the Constitution.100
The Court continued to deal with the privatization policies in the Oil
and Gas Law I Case.101 In this case, four human rights-based NGOs, a labor
union, and an academic challenged the constitutionality of the Law no. 22 of
2001 on Oil and Gas. The Court held that the Law did not relinquish state
control over oil and gas because all aspects of “controlled by the state,”
which include regulation, administration, management, supervision, remain
in the hands of government. 102 Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the
claimant that private business entities shall not be authorized to conduct
exploitation and exploration activities because it will deprive the state
control over oil and gas industry. 103
Apart from the issue of the state control, the Court also had to address
the fuel prices regulation and the production quota regulation, which
mandated the private business entity to provide a maximum of twenty-five
percent of its share of Crude Oil and/or natural Gas production to fulfill the
domestic demands.104 The Court held that the twenty-five percent maximum
production quota was contrary to Article 33(3) because the principle of
common good requires sufficient fuel stocks for domestic consumption. The
Court held that the provision potentially could be abused by private business
entities by providing a minimum amount of their oil and gas products, which
eventually would threaten the domestic oil supply. Finally, the Court had to
deal with the issue whether market mechanisms could properly govern fuel
prices. It held that fuel prices should be regulated by the Government rather
than by the market mechanism. 105

100
Article 33(2) of the Indonesian Constitution states that “[s]ectors of production which are
important for the country and affect the life of the people shall be under the powers of the State.” Undang
Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 33(2).
101
See Decision, Reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Natural Gas, No. 002/PUU-I/2003
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Oil and Natural Gas Law I Case]. The case is available
in English at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang
_eng_PUTUSAN%20PUU%20%20002-I-2003% 20(UU%20Migas)%20-%20English.pdf.
102
Id. at 220.
103
Id. at 222
104
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Gas, art. 22(1).
105
Oil and Natural Gas Law I Case, supra note 101, at 227.
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In the Water Resources Law I Case, 106 the Court, however, refused to
invalidate the Water Resources Law that accorded private corporations
control over Indonesia’s water resources. 107 Nevertheless, in its dicta the
Court stated that the government has a duty to fulfill citizen access to clean
water in several ways. 108 The Court stated further that “if the Law was
interpreted different that the Court’s guideline, then it can be reviewed
further (conditionally constitutional).”109 In other words, the Court viewed
that the Law is constitutional as long as the Government implements the
Law according to the Court’s interpretation, but if the Government
implements the law in different way, the claimant may challenge the statute
for further review. 110
Another important policy area for the Court was the protection of civil
and political rights, as many citizens expected the Court to correct past
human rights abuses. Indeed, in its first few years, the Court aggressively
pushed the government to recognize the protection of fundamental liberties
and correct its past errors. The first high profile civil and political rights
case was the Communist Party Case in 2003.111 The claimants were thirtyfive political activists who filed a petition challenging the constitutionality
of the General Election Law.112 The Law banned a former member of the
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia - PKI) and its
affiliate organizations from becoming a legislator in the national and local
parliaments. 113 The ban existed since the late 1960s, after the government
106
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources, No. 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004 (Constitutional Court, July 19, 2005), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/
persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Putusan%20058-059-063%20PUU-II-2004.%20008-PUU-III2005%20(UU%20SDA).pdf [hereinafter Water Resources Law Case].
107
Undang–Undang No. 7 Tahun 2004 tentang Sumber Daya Air [Law of the Republic of Indonesia,
No. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources].
108
Water Resources Law Case, supra note 106, at 492. The Court held that the state has 1) a duty as
regulator to issue license for water usage; 2) a duty to provide daily supply and irrigation for community
farming (pertanian rakyat); 3) regional owned water companies should be positioned as the state’s
operational unit and not as profit oriented company; and finally, 4) a duty to provide clean water is
basically in the hand of central government and regional government, any involvement of private
enterprises and cooperative are limited within the context that the government has not been able to provide
clean water itself.
109
Id. at 495
110
Id.
111
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 12 of 2003 on the Election of National and Regional
Parliament,
No.
011-017/PUU-I/2003
(Constitutional
Court,
Feb.
24,
2004),
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/Putusan0172003tgl240204.pdf
[hereinafter Communist Party Case].
112
See Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 12 of 2003 on General Election.
113
Id. art. 60(g).
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accused the Indonesian Communist Party of kidnapping and killing six
Army generals. 114 The Constitutional Court struck down the provision in the
General Election Law, and held “individual members of the Communist
Party and its affiliates should be treated equally as citizens without
discrimination.”115
The Court continued to pressure the government to respect
fundamental liberties in the Lese Majesty Case.116 Eggi Sudjana and
Pandapotan Lubis were two veteran activists who were facing charges for
insulting President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Both of them filed a
petition asking the Court to nullify the lese majesty articles in the Criminal
Code that formed the basis of their criminal charges. 117 The lese majesty is
an offense against the dignity of a reigning sovereignty or against a state.
The prohibition dated from the colonial period, but had been used by
subsequent governments to jail political opponents and regime critics.118
The Court accepted the petition and declared that the lese majesty articles
were unconstitutional. The Court held that “lese majesty articles were
irrelevant in a democratic state like Indonesia because they could negate the
principle of equality before the law, and moreover it could harm the freedom
of expression, freedom of information, and the principle of legal
uncertainty.” 119
In the Spreading Hatred Case,120 the Court unanimously invalidated
the “spreading hatred” articles.121 The claimant, Panji Utomo, is an activist
based in Aceh, who was convicted by a district court for violating the
“spreading hatred” articles. Utomo was found guilty of criticizing the work
of the Aceh and Nias Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency. The Court
114
For details on the impact of anti-communist witch-hunts, see ARIEL HERYANTO, STATE
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL IDENTITY IN INDONESIA: FATALLY BELONGING (2006).
115
See Communist Party Case, supra note 111, at 36–37.
116
Decision, Reviewing the Indonesian Criminal Code, No 013-022/PUU-IV/2006 (Constitutional
Court, Dec. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Lese Majeste Case].
117
Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, arts. 134, 136–37 [Criminal Code].
118
See JOSEPH SAUNDERS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN INDONESIA:
DISMANTLING SOEHARTO-ERA BARRIERS 53–61 (1998), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/indonesia2/
Borneote-07.htm.
119
Lese Majeste Case, supra note 116, at 61.
120
Decision, Reviewing Articles 154 and 155 of the Criminal Code, No. 6/PUU-V/2007
(Constitutional Court, July 17, 2007) [hereinafter Spreading Hatred Case].
121
The “spreading hatred” articles (Articles 154–57 of the Criminal Code) involve “public expression
of hate or insult to the government.” Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, arts. 154–57 [Criminal Code]. The
articles are different than the “lese majeste” articles (Articles 134–37 of the Criminal Code), which
criminalize insults directed at the president or the vice president. Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, arts.
134–37 [Criminal Code].
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ruled that the potential for the abuse of power through these articles is
flagrant because the provisions could be subjectively interpreted based on
the government’s interests.122 Prosecutors were not even required to prove
whether the statement or opinion had resulted in the spread of hatred or
hostility in general public. The Court ruled further that these articles were
irrational because a good abiding citizen would not hate his country or his
government, unless he plots a rebellion or coup d’état. 123 The Court finally
decided that these provisions were unconstitutional because they violated
constitutional rights to freedom of association and freedom of expression.
By the time the Court finished its first five-year term in 2008, it had
struck down many important acts of the legislature. The Chief Justice’s
heroic leadership style played an important role in shaping the Court’s
decisions. He managed to apply his vision that the Court should solve the
economic issues in transition and overcoming the legacy of Soeharto’s
authoritarian regime.
3.

Standing Strategy that Enhanced the Court’s Authority

One of the most important aspects of judicial review is the doctrine of
standing. Standing refers to the issue of who can bring a claim to the court,
including whether an individual or a designated institution can bring a claim.
Under the leadership of Jimly Asshiddiqie, the Court crafted a doctrine of
standing that expanded access for people to bring cases before the Court.
Moreover, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie used the standing doctrine as a strategy
to strengthen the judicial authority of his Court.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court established generalized
grievance standing, which allows a petitioner to assert an injury suffered by
all or a large number of class or citizens.124 Generalized grievance standing
was one of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie’s strategies to enhance the Court’s

122

Spreading Hatred Case, supra note 120, at 77–78, para. 3.18.6.
Id. at 78–79, para 3.18.7
124
In the U.S. constitutional realm, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a principle preventing
individuals from invoking generalized grievances standing. Thus, citizens are not allowed to sue if their
only injury is as a taxpayer or citizen concerned with having the government follow the Constitution. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 91 (2011). Unlike the U.S
Supreme Court, the Indonesian Constitutional Court allows individuals to have standing as a taxpayer or
citizen.
123

JUNE 2016

Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia

518

authority. 125 On the one hand, Asshiddiqie knew that the Court would not
be able to review economic and social policies if no one challenged those
policies before the Court. On the other hand, there were many NGOs whose
agenda was to challenge governmental policies, but were unable to do so in
the past. Asshiddiqie thus saw the potential for collaboration between the
Court and NGOs because they both shared a similar vision for political and
economic reform. 126 Therefore, he led the Court to apply generalized
grievance standing, which permits NGOs to challenge governmental policies
with minimal barriers in terms of standing.
The Court established this standing doctrine in the Electricity Law
case, discussed in the previous section of this article.127 The claimants were
human rights NGOs who argued that as non-profit organizations, they had
standing to represent the public.128 The Court held, “considering the
claimants are electricity consumers, and taxpayers, they have rights to
question every statute on economic policy that involved public welfare.”129
Thus, the Court allowed individuals and organizations to file petitions for
judicial review as consumers and taxpayers.
Later in the Oil & Gas Law I Case, 130 the Court reinforced the
generalized grievance standing approach. The claimants were four human
rights NGOs, which argued that as non-profit organizations they had
standing to represent the public in challenging the privatization of the state
owned oil company, Pertamina. 131 The Court held that the objective of
those NGOs was to fight for public interest advocacy, and therefore that the
petitioners had standing to raise constitutional issues. 132 In other words, the
125
See St. Hendrianto, From Humble Beginnings to a Functioning Court: The Indonesian
Constitutional Court, 2003–2008 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on
file with author).
126
Private Conversation with Jimly Asshiddiqie (Dec. 22, 2014). Interview with Jimly Asshiddiqie,
supra note 93.
127
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 20 of 2000 on Electrical Power, No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003
(Constitutional
Court,
Dec.
1,
2004),
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/
persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Putusan%20001-021-022_PUU
I_2003%20(UU%20Ketenagalistrikan)%20-%20English.doc.pdf.
128
Id. at 13–14.
129
Id. at 8.
130
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Natural Gas, No. 002/PUU-I/2003
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/
putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_PUTUSAN%20PUU%20%20002-I-2003%20(UU%20Migas)%20%20English.pdf.
131
Id. at 19.
132
Id. at 293–95.
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Court permitted public interest NGOs to come before the Court as defenders
of the people at large.
It appears that Chief Justice Asshiddiqie had total control over the
Court. The Chief Justice is indeed the spokesperson and public face of the
Court. Nevertheless, he is the first among equals, not a superior. The power
structure of the Constitutional Court is horizontal instead of vertical. Each
of the Court’s members has authority to weigh in on important decisions.
Moreover, there is always room for voices of dissent in the Court. Therefore
the Chief Justice cannot easily twist the direction of the Court based on his
own preference.
In some cases, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie faced opposition from his
associate justices. On the issue of taxpayer standing, two justices filed
dissenting opinions and argued against the application of the generalized
grievance form of standing.133 Chief Justice Asshiddiqie was fully aware
that he did not have absolute control over the Court’s decisions, and
therefore he needed to find a strategy to bridge the differences among the
justices. He decided to take on the role of the consensus builder. For
example, on the standing issue, he tried to build a consensus among his
colleagues that the Court needed to apply a more lenient standing test in its
early years of operation. One of the associate justices confirmed that the
Chief Justice managed to convince his brethren to apply a lenient standing
test to allow more parties (and more issues) to come before the Court.134
Furthermore, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie successfully convinced his
brethren not to express their dissent publicly. On the surface, the justices
were conscious of avoiding open opposition to each other.135 This gave the
impression that the Justices were usually in agreement and that there was
consensus among them on key issues. On the issue of standing, the minority
agreed to set aside their differences and therefore there was no need for them
to express their dissent publicly. In some cases, the dissenter did not write a
separate dissenting opinion and the Court only mentioned the summary of
the dissenting opinion without even mentioning the names of the dissenting
133
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 24 of 2002 on the Government Securities Law, No. 003/PUUI/2003 (Constitutional Court, Oct. 29, 2004).
134
Private Conversation with Maruarar Siahaan, Associate Justice of the Constitutional Court, in
Jakarta, Indon. (July 4, 2006).
135
Simon Butt, Judicial Review in Indonesia: Between Civil Law and Accountability? A Study of
Constitutional Court Decisions, 2003–2005, at 123 (Dec. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Melbourne) (on file with author).
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justices. Chief Justice Asshiddiqie might not have had total control over his
court, but as a consensus builder he was effective in managing dissenting
voices and minimizing the public impression of dissension on the Court.
Asshiddiqie’s standing strategy was, indeed, successful in building the
Court as a functioning institution. It enabled the Court to review various
governmental policies and pushed the government to comply with the
Constitution. Without Chief Justice Asshiddiqie’s strategy on standing, the
Court would not be able stand up against the other branches of government.
C.

The Extra-Judicial Role of the Chief Justice

The most visible example of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie’s heroic
leadership style was the initiative he took in employing strategies outside of
the courtroom to build the Court as a respected national institution. These
strategies came out as responses to external challenges that might have
otherwise undermined the Court’s authority.
The first external challenge for the Court was the lack of awareness
from general public about the very fact of the Court’s existence. As a newly
established institution, the Court struggled to find its place among the
constitutional stakeholders in Indonesia.136 In response to this challenge,
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie launched campaigns to raise the profile of the
Court. He initiated a weekly program to discuss the Court’s decisions on
national public television and radio. 137 He delivered many speeches about
the Constitutional Court, and he met with various social and political
groups.138
Secondly, the Court had to deal with the failure of the academic
community to generate constructive consideration of the Court’s decisions.
There were no well-managed legal reviews that could serve as a forum for
experts to discuss the Court’s decisions. Under such circumstances, Chief
Justice Asshiddiqie had to take initiative to explain the Court’s rulings
136
One of the best illustrations of this lack of awareness was an incident in which a University
declined to facilitate a public speaking engagement for a Constitutional Court justice. The university
administration assumed that the Constitutional Court fell under the Ministry of Justice, and therefore they
preferred to invite the Minister of Justice to speak on campus instead of a lower ranking official. See
Irmanputra Sidin, Sembilan Pintu Kebenaran Konstitusi [Nine Constitutional Gates], KOMPAS (Jan. 6,
2004), http://www.unisosdem.org/article_detail.php?aid=3463&coid=3&caid=21&gid=3.
137
See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, THREE YEARS OF THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra
note 74.
138
See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT (2007).
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through the media.139 The Chief Justice’s strategy was unorthodox.
Nevertheless, he had to take such action in order to minimize the confusion
among the constitutional stakeholders.
The Court’s third major external challenge came from the
government. The new democratic government in Indonesia was not always
keen to implement the Court’s decisions, giving rise to the possibility that
the government might simply ignore them. For instance, it took almost a
year for Chief Justice Asshiddiqie to persuade the government to implement
the Court’s decision in the Independent Candidate Case. 140 In this case, the
Court ordered the government to make a new law that would facilitate the
ability of independent candidates to run in regional elections. The
Government, however, refused to create the legislation mandated by the
Court.141
Having realized that the decision was ignored by the government,
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie decided to confront the President directly in a
private meeting. The day after the meeting, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie held a
press conference in which he assured public that the Court ruling on
independent candidates would be implemented soon.142 Finally, in April
2008, nine months after the Court issued its decision, the government and
the House of Representatives passed the law that set the rules for
independent candidates. 143 The Court in its early stages needed a leader like
139
For example, the Chief Justice had to explain the Court’s decision in the Communist Party Case.
As explained in the previous section, the Court decided in the Communist Party Case that a former member
of the Communist Party may run for a position in the legislature. Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 12 of
2003 on the Election of National and Regional Parliament, No. 011-017/PUU-I/2003 (Constitutional Court,
Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/Putusan017200
3tgl240204.pdf. The General Election Commission, however, did not know what to do with the Court’s
decision. By the time the Court announced its decision, the deadline for the submission of legislative
candidates had passed, and therefore the former member of the Communist Party would not be able to run
in the legislative election. Chief Justice Asshidiqie made a press statement and announced that the decision
would not have immediate effect; hence it could only be implemented for the 2009 General Elections. See
Bekas PKI Boleh Memilih dan Dipilih [Former PKI May Cast a Vote and Be Elected], TEMPO INTERAKTIF
(Feb. 24, 2004), https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2004/02/24/05539980/mahkamah-konstitusi-bekas-pkiboleh-memilih-dan-dipilih.
140
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 32 of 2004 on the Regional Election, No. 05/PUU-V/2007
(Constitutional Court, July 23, 2007).
141
Pemerintah Bersikeras Tak Keluarkan Perpu [The Government Insisted Not to Issue Government
Regulation in Lieu of Law], HUKUMONLINE (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/
hol17376/pemerintah-bersikeras-tak-keluarkan-perpu.
142
Independent candidates can run in 2008: Jimly, JAKARTA POST (Aug. 13, 2007),
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/08/13/independent-candidates-can-run-2008-jimly.html
143
Independents To Start Running in June, JAKARTA POST (April 3, 2008).
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Asshiddiqie who was persistent in reminding the government that they
should comply with the Court’s ruling.
Chief Justice Ashiddiqie’s strategies outside the courtroom, however,
could provoke counter attack from the government. In the Oil and Gas Law
I Case, 144 the Court invalidated the law the allowed the market to govern
fuel prices.145 The Court ruled that the government should determine the
fuel prices, not the market. In response, the Government issued a
Presidential Regulation that set fuel prices based on market mechanisms. 146
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie wrote a letter to the President urging him to
comply with the Court’s decision.147 The President wrote back and
explained that the government had done nothing illicit, since the Court
already gave authority to the government to determine fuel prices.148
Furthermore, the President warned the Court not to trespass on other
governmental branches’ jurisdiction and authority. 149 In addition, the
Parliamentary Speaker Agung Laksono also warned the Chief Justice not to
meddle in politics by sending a letter to the President.150 Having realized
that the issue had become too sensitive, Chief Justice’s Ashiddiqie decided
to accept the government’s explanation and closed the discussion.
The fourth external challenge for the Court was to build its profile as a
respected institution. For many years the authoritarian government in
Indonesia treated the judiciary as an extension of executive authority. The
judges were treated as civil servants and subjected to compulsory
membership in the government-sponsored civil service union.151
Consequently, the judiciary had never enjoyed a respected status over the
course of Indonesian history. Moreover, the Chief Justice of the Supreme

144
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Natural Gas, No. 002/PUU-I/2003
(Constitutional Court, Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/
putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_PUTUSAN%20PUU%20%20002-I-2003%20(UU%20Migas)%20%20English.pdf.
145
Id.
146
Presidential Decree No. 55 of 2005 on Domestic Fuel Prices (Sept. 30, 2005).
147
Letter from Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court to the President of Republic of
Indonesia (Oct. 6, 2005) (on file with the author).
148
Letter from the President of Republic of Indonesia to the Chief Justice of Constitutional Court,
(Oct. 14, 2005) (on file with the author).
149
Id.
150
Agung Laksono, Jimly Diminta Tak Berpolitik [Jimly Was Warned Not to Meddle in Politics],
KORAN TEMPO, Oct. 12, 2005.
151
See POMPE, supra note 54, at 128.
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Court had been considered a second-class officer in the government
hierarchy. 152
Within this context, Asshiddiqie fought for the recognition that the
judicial branch was on par with its executive counterpart. For example, in
his first months in office, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie complained that he did
not receive facilities and benefits that reflected his status as a high-ranking
official.153 He went to the government, and demanded a house and car,
because the other high-ranking officers in Indonesia received a house and a
car. After long delay, the government agreed to grant him proper benefits as
the Chief Justice of Constitutional Court. Later, when he was re-elected as
Chief Justice in 2006, he took the oath by himself while President Susilo
Bambang Yudhyono watched behind him. 154 This seemingly small gesture
signified his efforts to place himself on an equal footing with the President.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie believed that the Court needed
a great office building to symbolize the importance of the institution. After
using a temporary office for quite a while, he came up with a plan to build a
new office. He proposed a budget of RP 191 billion (around US 180
million) for a sixteen-floor office building. In the beginning, the Parliament
opposed the plan; however, he vigorously lobbied the House Judiciary
Committee and convinced them to approve the Court’s plan to build a
permanent office building. 155 Finally the parliament approved the plan and
by the time the Court finished its calendar year in 2007, it had a magnificent
new facility with elaborate architecture.156 The Chief Justice explained that
the Greek style of the building represented the notion of democracy
emerging from ancient Greece, and signified the Court’s role as the guardian
of the Constitution in democratic Indonesia. 157 The Chief Justice also
decided not to build fences around the Court building, so that the people
152
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Court, Wirjono Projodikoro, joined President Soekarno on his 1959 state visit to the United States and was
given the status of parliamentarian. Projodikoro was seated with senators and congressmen, while the
American Chief Justice Earl Warren sat with Soekarno and President Eisenhower. Id. at 44.
153
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could come freely to the Court. Moreover, he designated a special spot in
front of the building for the people to have an open assembly. Again,
Asshiddiqie wanted to signal that the Court was the forum for citizens to
express their opinion.
Yet Ashiddiqie and his associate justices would only occupy the new
office for a short period of time. The justices of the Constitutional Court
would finish their terms in August 2008, and nobody knew whether they
would be reappointed for their second five-year term. Three of them, Laica
Marzuki, Achmad Roestandi, and Soedarsono were obligated to retire
earlier, having reached the mandatory retirement age of 67.158 Moreover, it
was unclear whether Chief Justice Asshiddiqie himself would be reappointed
for a second five-year term.
D.

The Fall of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie

A skilled Chief Justice like Asshiddiqie might have been the proper
figure to lead the Court in transition; nevertheless, he occupied a vulnerable
position. Like the rest of the associate justices, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie
had a limited term—the judge can only serve two five- year terms—and
therefore he had to please those who had the authority to reappoint him for a
new term. 159 Moreover, the Law states that the Chief Justice serves a threeyear term, though he can be reelected for a new term. 160 As the Chief
Justice, Asshiddiqie had to face reelection every three years and
consequently was forced to please his own associate justices in order to be
reelected. The discussion on this subject will give an insight on what the
Chief Justices in a newly established Court might learn in building its
judicial power.
In March 2008, the House reappointed Jimly Ashiddiqie for his
second five-year term (2008–2013) and he was quite confident that he would
continue to lead the Court. Asshiddiqie was elected Chief Justice for the
first time in 2003 and was reelected in 2006, so presumably he would remain
as Chief Justice until 2009. 161 Nevertheless, by the time the Court began its
new calendar year in August 2008, six new associate justices joined the
bench and they demanded the election of a new Chief Justice. On August
158
159
160
161

Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, art. 23(1).
Id. art. 22.
Id. art. 4(3).
Jimly Asshiddiqie the Face of Controversial Constitutional Court, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 3, 2008.
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20, 2008, the Court held an election for Chief Justice and a new associate
Justice. Mohammad Mahfud defeated Chief Justice Asshiddiqie by one vote
in the election.
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie suspected that the Yudhyono administration
orchestrated his removal due to the Court’s decision to review the allocation
of educational budget in the state budget.162 The Constitution requires the
government allocate a minimum of twenty percent of the state budget to
education.163 The Court held that the 2008 State Budget was in violation of
the Constitution because it allocated less than the mandated twenty percent
of the budget to education. 164 The Court ruled that the President and the
House were guilty of deliberate defiance of the Constitution and demanded
the full allocation be met in the 2009 budget. But the Court allowed the
existing underfunded budget to stand until the 2009 budget cycle took effect,
arguing a delay was necessary “to avoid governmental disaster”. 165 The
Court decided the Education Budget III Case on August 13, 2008 and
Asshiddiqie believes that the decision prompted the Yudhoyono
administration to arrange for his removal during the election of Chief Justice
on August 20, 2008. 166 The new Chief Justice Muhammad Mahfud himself
admitted that the then Vice President Jusuf Kalla asked him to run against
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie.167 Although Mahfud never explained the
motivation behind the Vice President’s encouragement, it is easy to suspect
that the government wanted to replace Asshiddiqie because the government
was annoyed with Asshiddiqie’s leadership style.
One of the most plausible reasons for the Executive to support
Mahfud was his view on the role of the Court. While he was serving as a
member of the House Judiciary Committee, Mahfud expressed his
disagreement with Asshiddiqie’s approach to judicial review. He accused
Asshiddiqie of steering the Court in the wrong direction, and he urged the
Court to exercise judicial restraint in order to get back on track. He
proposed a formula of “10 taboos” that could serve as a template for the
162
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Court’s self-restraint. 168 His first taboo was that the Court should not create
any new rule or regulation in its decisions. Second, the Court should not
review any governmental policy. Third, the Court should make its decisions
solely based on the Constitution. As the fourth taboo, he stated that the
Court should not impinge upon the jurisdiction of legislative. The fifth was
that the Court should not make reference to any constitutional theories or
case precedents from foreign countries. As the sixth taboo, he posited that
the Court should recuse itself when it has self-interest in certain cases such
as the cases addressing Article 50 that involved the Court’s jurisdictional
limitation. Giving interviews in the news media or offering public
comments formed the seventh taboo. The eighth taboo was that the Court
should not build close relationships with any groups or help them to bring
cases before the Court. Mahfud envisioned the ninth taboo as a general
prohibition on the Justices engaging in any activism outside of the Court.
Finally, he was convinced that the Justices should not criticize the
Constitution.169 With this vision of extreme judicial restraint, Mahfud was
the ideal candidate to dismantle Jimly Asshiddiqie’s work as the Court’s first
leader. The government had grown irritated with Asshiddiqie, who led the
Court in challenging many governmental policies. In Mahfud, Asshiddiqie’s
opponents believed they had found the right man to make the Court more
subservient to the other branches of government.
Mahfud was sworn in as the second Chief Justice of the Constitutional
Court on August 21, 2008. Initially, Asshiddiqie remained as an associate
justice; however, on October 8, 2008, he submitted his resignation from the
Constitutional Court. During a press interview, he explained that he quit due
to “psychological” tensions that had jeopardized his relations with the other
eight justices and all court officials. Asshiddiqie said at a press conference,
“I think this is the right time for me to leave, in the hope that it will help the
Chief Justice, the other Justices and all the court officials conduct their
duties with ease.”170 Chief Justice Mahfud, however, denied Asshiddiqie’s
claim about psychological tension within the Court. 171 For this reason, there
was doubt about the real reason behind the resignation of Jimly Asshiddiqie,
but one thing was clear: his decision to step down marked the end of an era,
and the beginning of the Mahfud Court.
168
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After his resignation from the Court, Asshiddiqie initially took a break
from politics. He came back to the stage of national politics in 2010 when
President Yudhoyono appointed him as a member of the Presidential
Advisory Board. Having spent six months as one of the President’s Advisor,
Asshiddqie tendered his resignation because he wanted to make a bid to be
selected for the top post of Anti-Corruption Commission leader. Despite the
massive public support for Asshiddiqie as a potential Anti-Corruption
Commission’s chief, he did not even made it through to the final selection
test before the House Judiciary Committee. 172 Asshiddiqie’s resignation
from the Court and failure to secure a position in the Anti-Corruption
Commission marked his waning political influence.
The fall of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie raised the critical issue of
judicial independence in the Indonesian Constitutional Court, especially in
regard to the term of the justices. Term length is a key component of
judicial independence; if the appointment term is longer the judges are likely
more independent in exercising their authority. 173 Mandatory term limits
remain a weak point of the current structure of the Indonesian Constitutional
Court. Although the government does not have direct control over the
election of the Chief Justice, they can support associate justices likely to oust
the Chief Justice from his leadership role. In sum, short mandatory term
limits are a primary mechanism for the Indonesian government to control the
agenda and reach of the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
V.

REMAKING
MADE

THE

COURT: MOHAMMAD MAHFUD

AND THE

COURT HE

Before reviewing the performance of Mahfud Court, an overview of
Mahfud’s personal background is helpful to explain his leadership style after
he took the helm of Chief Justice.
A.

Mohammad Mahfud: A Man Who Served in the Three Branches of
Government.

Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin (commonly known as Mahfud MD)
grew up in Madura, an Indonesian island off the northeastern coast of

172
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Java. 174 A majority of Madurese Muslims are proponents of santri tradition,
a more orthodox version of Islam, which was influenced by Sunni Islam, the
largest denomination school of the religion. Mahfud grew up in a family
with santri tradition, and his early education took place in an Islamic
boarding school (pesantren). 175
Mahfud attended Faculty of Law of Indonesian Islamic University in
Yogyakarta, where he was actively involved in the Indonesian Islamic
Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam). 176
Upon his
graduation, Mahfud became a professor of constitutional law at his alma
mater. Later, he obtained his doctoral degree in constitutional law from
Gadjah Mada University, the oldest public University in the country.
Mahfud rose to national prominence when the late President Abdurrahman
Wahid appointed him Minister of Defense in 2000. There was some
speculation that the appointment was solely based on Mahfud’s affiliation
with the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the largest traditional Islamic organization
in Indonesia, which was once led by President Wahid. For many Madurese
like Mahfud, being a Muslim means “being a sympathiser of the NU[,]” but
“[t]his strong identification . . . does not automatically mean that they have
to officially become a member of the organization.” 177
After Mahfud served for nearly a year as the Minister of Defense,
President Wahid appointed him to be the Minister of Justice. He did not
hold that position for a long time, however, because the People’s
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) impeached
President Wahid in 2001. After Wahid’s impeachment and removal from
office, Mahfud became active in the National Awakening Party (Partai
Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB), which was founded by President Wahid.
From 2004 to 2008, Mahfud represented PKB in the House of
Representatives and served as the member of the Judiciary Committee. By
the time Mahfud assumed the role of Chief Justice he was the only politician
174
Mahfud rarely uses his complete name Muhammad Mahfud Mahmodin, and thus, in this article, I
use Muhammad Mahfud instead. Mahfud explains that the name of Mahmodin is basically his father’s
name and his primary school teacher added the name to his original name in order to distinguish him with
many other students who were also named Mahfud. See AGUK IRAWAN MN, NOVEL BIOGRAFI MAHFUD
MD: CAHAYAMU TAK BISA KUTAWAR [MAHFUD’S BIOGRAPHY: I CANNOT DENY YOUR LIGHT] 87–88
(2014).
175
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in Indonesia who served in all three branches of government. With his
background and experience, Mahfud was a credible contender against a high
profile Chief Justice like Jimly Asshiddiqie. Mahfud’s social and political
connections also advanced his ability to compete with someone like Jimly
Asshiddiqie.
B.

The Mahfud Court: Heavy on Promises, Mixed Record on Results

Chief Justice Mahfud came to the bench with a vision of strong
judicial restraint and he did not present any sign of an unpredictable
leadership style like his predecessor. Reviewing the decisions of Mahfud
Court is helpful to evaluate his leadership style and how faithful he was to
his vows of judicial restraint.
1.

Less Favorable Treatment of Individual Rights

One of the important focuses of Asshiddiqie’s Court was on the issue
of civil and political rights. In many different cases, Asshiddiqie’s Court
tried to push the government to recognize the protection of individual rights.
It is helpful to draw comparisons between the decisions of the Asshiddiqie
Court and Mahfud Court.
The first major decision of Mahfud Court on the individual rights
cases was the Pornographic Law Case.178 The Pornography Law defines
pornography as “pictures, sketches, illustrations, photographs, articles,
sounds, voices, moving pictures, animations, cartoons, conversations, body
movements or other forms of messages through various communication
mediums and/or public displays that contain obscenity or sexual exploitation
that violates community norms”. 179 Some NGOs sought to challenge the
Law before the Constitutional Court.180 The Court rejected the claimant’s
petition and held that although the Constitution guarantees some
fundamental rights, there is a general limitation to those rights as stipulated
in the Constitution by Article 28J(2). 181 The Court further held that “the
178
Decision, Reviewing the Law No. 44 of 2008 on Pornography, No. 10-17-23/PUU-VII/2009
(Constitutional Court, Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter the Pornography Law Case]. For background
information on the litigation, see HOROWITZ, supra note 61, at 252–53.
179
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 44 of 2008 on Pornography, art. 1 (1).
180
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Democracy, and the Women’s Solidarity Union.
181
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limitation upon individual rights, including freedom of expression is not
contrary to the Constitution, as long as such limitation is based upon
recognition of other people’s rights and freedoms plus consideration of
morality, and public order in a democratic society.” 182 Finally, the Court
held the Law took into account Indonesian community values of propriety
(nilai–nilai kesusilaan).183 Nevertheless, the Court did not clarify the
meaning of community values of propriety and it did not define the “right of
others” that is believed should prevail over the freedom of expression.184
The bottom line is that the Court recognized the authority of the government
to curtail individual rights, an approach that stood in marked contrast from
the approach of the previous Court that aggressively pushed the government
to respect fundamental liberties.
Soon after the Pornography Law Case, the Court also upheld the
constitutionality of the Blasphemy Law. 185 The Blasphemy Law dates from
the era of Guided Democracy (1959–1965) when Soekarno, the first
Indonesian President, tried to mobilize nationalist, religious, and communist
forces to buttress his political power. 186 The Law recognized that the
majority of the Indonesian people adhere to six major religionsIslam,
Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianismand
it mandated that the Government protect these religions. 187 The Law also
created several protection mechanisms to achieve this aim. First, it was
unlawful to communicate, propagate, or to solicit public support for an
interpretation of a religion that deviates from the teaching of that religion.188
Second, it set criminal penalties for intentionally criticizing or attempting to
freedoms of others and of satisfying just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious values,
security and public order in a democratic society.” Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia
[Constitution] 1945, art. 28J(2).
182
Pornography Law Case, supra note 180, at 387.
183
Id.
184
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185
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of Religion (Blasphemy Law), Law 5 of 1969, No. 140/PUU-VII/2009 (Constitutional Court, Apr. 19,
2010) [hereinafter Blasphemy Law Case]. For a detailed analysis of the Court’s decision in the Blasphemy
Law Case, see Melissa A. Crouch, Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the
Blasphemy Law, 7 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 5 (2012). See also MELISSA CROUCH, LAW AND RELIGION IN
INDONESIA: CONFLICT AND THE COURTS IN WEST JAVA (2014) [hereinafter CROUCH, CONFLICT AND THE
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undermine the six major religions, including a maximum penalty of five
years’ imprisonment. 189 The Law, however, recognized other religions such
as Judaism, Shinto, Taoism, and others as legitimate so long as they
complied with the prohibition under the Blasphemy Law and other statutory
regulations. 190
Some NGOs and political activists requested that the Mahfud Court
declare the Blasphemy Law unconstitutional because it ran contrary to the
religious liberty clause 191 and freedom of expression clause of the
Constitution.192 The Court rejected the petition and took a similar approach
to that adopted in the Pornographic Law Case. The Court held that the
Blasphemy Law is the manifestation of Article 28J(2), and therefore the
state has the authority to limit liberty as long as it based upon recognition of
other people’s rights and freedoms. 193 This restriction pertains to morality,
religion, and public order in a democratic society. 194 The Court held that the
Blasphemy Law was never intended to curtail religious freedom, but rather
was aimed to protect religion.195 On the issue of freedom of expression, the
Court viewed that the claimants had misinterpreted the scope and meaning
of freedom of expression as unlimited rights. 196 The Court held that freedom
of expression can be limited and even be sanctioned. 197 Clearly, the
Blasphemy Law Case reaffirmed the Court’s stand on the general limitations
of rights by Article 28J(2), which also include limitations on free speech.
With this ruling, the Court supported the idea that religious “deviancy” leads
to social disorder, which was argued by many Islamic leaders and the
government during oral argument.198
After the Court announced its decision, the claimants went to the
House of Representative and urged the legislators to examine the Court’s

189
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decision in the Blasphemy Law Case.199 The claimants alleged that the
Court had manipulated the affidavit from the National Human Rights
Commission, which stated the Law was necessary to preserve public
order. 200 The claimants presented some evidence that the National Human
Rights Commission suggested otherwise. Chief Justice Mahfud responded
by accusing the NGOs who filed the complaint of merely seeking attention
and he questioned their credibility as human rights advocates. 201
Despite the Mahfud Court’s tendency to defer to lawmakers, in some
instances, the Court tried to protect constitutional rights of citizens. In the
Book Banning Case, the Court decided to nullify the law which allowed the
Attorney-General's Office (AGO) to ban books. 202 The case originated from
the 1963 Law on Securing Printed Materials that allowed the AGO to ban
distribution and confiscate books whose content could disrupt the public
order. In 2009, the AGO banned five books, which included the book
Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s
Coup d’Etat in Indonesia by John Roosa of the University of British
Colombia. 203 The Court, however, did not make any explicit ruling on the
freedom of speech. Instead, the Court appeared to consider the books as
“property.” The Court ruled the authority of the Attorney General to ban
and seize the books and printed materials without any judicial proceedings
could be considered an extra-judicial execution that violated individuals’
rights to own property. 204
Some of the Mahfud Court decisions in the area of civil and political
rights signified an important departure from the Court’s earlier approach.
The Asshiddiqie Court believed that it was the duty of the Court to correct
governmental infringement upon constitutional rights and therefore the court
199
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should protect such rights. On the contrary, the Mahfud Court seemed to
defer to the government in the arena of civil and political rights, but some of
the Court decisions were often inconsistent with Chief Justice Mahfud’s own
rhetoric.205 In many instances, Chief Justice Mahfud defended a progressive
point of view and a flexible constitutional interpretation, but the Court
decisions in the Pornography Law Case and the Blasphemy Law Case were
far from a progressive and flexible interpretation. 206
2.

More Favorable Treatment to Administrative Law Cases

Although Mahfud came to the Court vowing judicial restraint, he did
not remain faithful to that vow. He broke it in instances when the Court has
reviewed administrative policies and produced a set of new rules. Take, for
example, the Court’s decision in the ID Card Case. 207 The case arose from
poor election management that caused around forty-seven million voters to
be unregistered in legislative elections.208 Refli Harun was a political
activist who was not registered as a voter. He filed a petition to the Court
and challenged the Election Law. The Court held that all Indonesian citizens
who were not registered on the final electoral roll could show their IDs in
order to cast a vote and for those who are living overseas can use their
passports to cast a vote.209 The Court held further that voters using an ID
card must also show their family card (Kartu Keluarga) and may only cast
their ballot in their residential neighborhood. 210
Chief Justice Mahfud broke his own enumerated taboos because the
Court created a new rule about voting registration in this decision. Mahfud,
however, argued that he had to make such decision in response to the critical
situation in national politics.211 Chief Justice Mahfud made a reference to
presidential candidates Jusuf Kalla and Megawati Soekarnoputri who
threatened to withdraw from the presidential race if the General Elections
205
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Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU) did not allow unregistered
voters to use their ID cards to cast a ballot. Mahfud argued that the
withdrawal of Megawati and Jusuf Kalla from the presidential race would
threaten the legitimacy of democracy in Indonesia, and therefore the Court
should intervene and save the democratic process.212
Chief Justice Mahfud continued to break his taboos in the Attorney
General Case.213 The case originated from the political conflict between the
Yudhoyono administration and a veteran politician, Yusril Ihza Mahendra.
Mahendra served in the First Yudhoyono administration as the State
Secretary; however, in May 2007, President Yudhoyono dismissed
Mahendra due to his alleged involvement in several high-profile graft cases.
On June 24, 2010, the Attorney General’s Office named and charged
Mahendra under the Anti-Corruption Law for his approval of the Ministry of
Justice’s online corporate registration system (Sistem Administrasi Badan
Hukum—Sisminbakum). Mahendra fought back by filing a petition to the
Constitutional Court, in which he challenged the appointment of the then
Attorney General Hendarman Supandji. Mahendra argued that Supandji was
an illegitimate Attorney General because he had never been formally reappointed as the Attorney General after he finished his first term in office.214
Mahendra argued that as an illegitimate Attorney General, Supandji had no
authority to take legal actions against him. The President’s legal team
argued that formal re-appointment for the Attorney General was unnecessary
because the Law prescribed that the Attorney General would remain in the
office until he was dismissed from his post. 215
The Court majority ruled that the Attorney General Law created legal
uncertainty because it did not provide any clarity on when the Attorney
General shall begin and end his term in office.216 Nevertheless, the Court
held that the law is “conditionally constitutional,” as it should be interpreted
to mean that the Attorney General should serve a five year term like the
President and others cabinet ministers, and can be removed by the President
at any time. 217 Here, the Court tried to frame its decision with different
212

Situasi Agak Gawat [It Was a Critical Moment], KOMPAS, July 7, 2009.
Reviewing Law No. 16 of 2004 on the Attorney General Office, No. 49/PUU-VIII/2010
(Constitutional Court Oct. 16, 2010) [hereinafter the Attorney General Case].
214
Yusril Files Report Against Attorney General, JAKARTA POST (July 1, 2010),
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/01/yusril-files-report-against-attorney-general.html.
215
Attorney General Case, supra note 215, at 64–66.
216
Id. at 132–33, para 3.31.
217
Id. at 133, para 3.32.
213

535

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 3

language, which can be confusing. Instead of declaring the Attorney
General Law unconstitutional, it declared that the law is “conditionally
constitutional.”
In response to the Court’s decision, Denny Indrayana, the President’s
legal adviser, argued that Supandji was still a legitimate Attorney General
because the Court did not explicitly rule that his appointment was
unconstitutional.218 Mahendra, however, believed that Supandji was no
longer legally the Attorney General.219 Chief Justice Mahfud decided to
intervene by urging the President to dismiss the Attorney General
Hendarman Supandji immediately. 220 President Yudhoyono decided to
uphold the Court ruling by removing Hendarman Supandji from his post.
Mahfud explained that he had to intervene to resolve the conflict of
interpretation between Mahendra and the President’s legal adviser or
otherwise there would be an endless conflict of interpretation. 221
The Mahfud Court continued to be defiant of governmental policies in
the area of administrative law when the Court decided the Deputy Minster
Case. 222 The State Ministry Law allowed the President to appoint a deputy
minister to assist some of the minister’s responsibilities.223 In his second
administration, President Yudhoyono appointed twenty Deputy Ministers.224
An NGO named the National Movement to Eradicate Corruption (GNPK)
challenged the appointment of those deputy ministers and argued that the
positions were unnecessary and a waste of state funds.
The Court struck down the elucidation of article 10 of the State
Ministry Law which defined deputy ministers as career bureaucrats. The
218
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Court held that deputy ministers are not members of the cabinet minister.
The Court considered that elucidation of article 10 would cause legal
complication because there is no clarity of the term length for a deputy
minister’s position.225 The Court expressed a concern that as a career
bureaucrat, a deputy minister could stay in his position indefinitely even
though the President and his cabinet ministers had finished their term in
office.226 Finally, the Court held that the President’s Yudhoyono’s
appointment of deputy ministers based on Article 10 elucidation was
unconstitutional.227
3.

Preserving the Legacy of Standing Doctrines

One of Mahfud’s ten taboos provided that the Court should not review
governmental policy. Many of Chief Justice Mahfud’s decisions were
clearly inconsistent with this taboo. In some instances, he clearly broke his
taboo by leading the Court to review some governmental policies.
Moreover, Chief Justice Mahfud employed the same interpretation of
standing as his predecessor, in which the Court applied general grievance
standing in order to open the door to reviewing governmental policies.
An apt example of the Mahfud Court’s reaffirmation of its
predecessor’s strategy is the Court’s decision in the Oil and Gas III Case.228
The claimants in this case were twelve Islamic based organizations and
thirty individuals, chiefly led by Muhammadiyah, one of the largest Islamic
organizations in the country. The claimants challenged some of the key
statutory provisions, which mandated the government establish a Regulatory
Agency to supervise the oil and gas sector. 229 They argued that these
statutory provisions would reduce the state control over natural resources
and those resources then could not be used to the greatest benefit of the
people as mandated by article 33 section 3 of the Constitution.230
The claimants argued that the government policies to privatize oil and
gas industries had infringed on their constitutional rights of development.231
225
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Moreover, Muhammadiyah as the chief petitioner also stated that they came
before the Court as Islamic organizations that had the objective to establish
Islamic civil society, and, thus, had standing to represent public interest.232
The Court ruled that Muhammadiyah and others had standing to bring the
case because their constitutional rights may potentially be injured by the
application of the law. 233 In its ruling, the Court did not explicitly state that
Muhammadiyah as a religious based NGO may enter the stage of
constitutional litigation as a public defender. Nonetheless, by granting
standing to Muhammadiyah, the Mahfud Court continued to apply a loose
standing doctrine.234
The Court also allowed an NGO to challenge the authority of the
Ministry of Forestry to grant large concessions to private mining companies
for mining exploration in the Indigenous Forest Case.235 The case was
significant because Indonesia's central government had control over the
country’s vast forest area and thus the Ministry of Forestry had rights to
grant large concessions to private companies for logging, plantations, and
mining exploration even if the area had been managed for generations by
indigenous people. The case was initiated by an NGO, Indigenous Peoples
Alliance of the Archipelago (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara or
AMAN), which claimed that they represented indigenous people across the
archipelago.236 The Court ruled that as an NGO who had concern over
indigenous issues, the petitioner had standing to challenge the Forestry Law
before the Court.237
C.

The Heroic Leadership Continued

While Mahfud’s rhetoric emphasized judicial restraint, in many cases,
the Mahfud Court demonstrated that it inherited many of the ambitions of
232

Id. at 20–21. See also Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art.

28C(2).
233

Oil and Gas III Case, supra note 228, at 179–80.
Id. at 214. There is a dissenting opinion in which Justice Haryono argued that the plaintiffs have
no standing to bring the case. Justice Haryono did not write a lengthy dissent and he simply criticized the
Court majority for their lack of consideration with regard to the standing issue. He believed that the Court
did not provide sufficient legal reasoning in reaching a conclusion that the plaintiffs have standing to argue
before the Court.
235
Decision, Reviewing Law No. 41 of 1999 on Forestry, No. 35/PUU-X/2012 (Constitutional Court,
May 16, 2013) [hereinafter Indigenous Forest Case].
236
See Organization Profile, ALIANSI MASYARAKAT ADAT NUSANTARA [INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
ALLIANCE OF THE ARCHIPELAGO], http://www.aman.or.id/wp-content/plugins/downloads-manager/upload/
Profil_AMAN.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
237
Indigenous Forest Case, supra note 235, at 164.
234

JUNE 2016

Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia

538

Chief Justice Asshiddiqie. During his tenure as the Chief Justice, Mahfud
took the same path as his predecessor to expand the Court’s authority. One
of the Asshiddiqie Court’s legacies preserved by the Mahfud Court was the
Regional Election disputes. While he was still in office, Chief Justice
Asshiddiqie made a proposal to the House of Representatives to grant new
authority for the Court to handle regional election disputes. 238 Initially, the
Supreme Court had authority to handle regional election disputes, which
included elections for Governor and Head of Regency (Bupati).239
Nevertheless, one of the most visible problems facing the Supreme Court
was the extensive backlogs that plagued the Court for several decades.240
The jurisdiction over regional elections disputes did not help the Supreme
Court in overcoming backlogs. Chief Justice Asshiddiqie proposed to take
over the regional election disputes in order to ease the burdens on the
Supreme Court. On April 28, 2008, the House (DPR) passed a new law that
authorized the Constitutional Court to handle regional election disputes.241
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie then graciously accepted the new authority and
tried to show that the Constitutional Court was better prepared than the
Supreme Court to handle election disputes.
Chief Justice Asshiddiqie did not have to deal with the influx of the
regional election disputes, as he resigned from the Court in October 2008. It
was Chief Justice Mahfud who led the Court to handle these disputes.
Despite the flood of cases, the Mahfud Court continued to broaden the scope
of the Court’s authority. Initially, the law prescribed that the object of
adjudication could only concern the final result of the regional election.242
The Mahfud Court, however, went further to review any infringement upon
regional election processes, including both administrative and criminal
infringement. 243
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Chief Justice Mahfud also followed the path of his predecessor by
trying to resolve political crises. The most obvious example was the
Hamzah & Riyanto Case. 244 The claimants in this case, Chandra Hamzah
and Bibit Riyanto, were the Commissioners of the Anti-Corruption
Commission. The Commission managed to wiretap a high-ranking police
official on the suspicion that the official was taking bribes. The Indonesian
National Police then moved to incriminate Hamzah and Riyanto, alleging
that they abused their power.245 As Hamazh and Riyanto’s trial loomed,
there was significant public pressure on President Yudhoyono to save the
Anti-Corruption Commission. President Yudhoyono issued a Government
Regulation in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang—
Undang or PERPU) that gave himself power to appoint the Anti-Corruption
Commissioner if three or more commissioner positions became vacant.246
Prior to the enactment of this PERPU, the Law required the positions to be
filled using a rigorous fit and proper test in the parliament. Under the
PERPU, the President had authority to appoint temporary commissioners to
fill the vacant positions with commissioners who had the same rights,
powers, and obligation as did commissioners serving full terms.
Many legal analysts criticized President Yudhoyono for issuing the
PERPU and moreover, they blamed the Chief Justice for advising the
President to pass the PERPU. Chief Justice Mahfud admitted that he had
advised President Yudhoyono to pass the PERPU. 247 But Mahfud stated that
he had no hidden agenda other than to save the Anti-Corruption
Commission.248 Furthermore, Chief Justice Mahfud continued to advise the
President on the selection process of temporary commissioners.
In the meantime, Hamzah and Riyanto went to the Constitutional
Court and challenged the law that could cause their removal from the
Commission. The Law stated, “The Anti-Corruption Commissioners are to
PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA HASIL PEMILUKADA OLEH MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI [STUDY ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SETTLEMENT OF LOCAL ELECTION DISPUTE BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT]
(2012).
244
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245
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leave their positions or to be removed from their positions if they become a
defendant in a criminal case.”249 Hamzah and Riyanto argued that the
provision contravened their constitutional right to a presumption of
innocence.250 Moreover, they argued that the Law is discriminatory because
all other state officials had the benefit of the doubt until convicted, in which
they could be suspended but not dismissed. 251
Hamzah and Riyanto asked the Court to issue an interim injunction to
prevent their dismissal before the Court could hear their case. Considering
that the Court’s authority was limited to determining the constitutionality of
a statue and issuing appropriate declaratory remedies as claimed, in theory
the Court had no authority to issue an injunctive remedy to prevent the
criminal investigation of Hamzah and Riyanto. Surprisingly, the Court
decided that it could issue an injunction. But on the question of to whom the
injunction would be directed, the Court admitted that it lacked jurisdiction to
order police and prosecutors to postpone the criminal investigations against
Hamzah and Riyanto. 252 Finally, the Court ordered the President to refrain
from suspending Hamzah and Riyanto until a final verdict was issued.253
Having realized that the Court lacked authority to stop the criminal
proceeding, Chief Justice Mahfud criticized the police in the media and
urged the police to bring the Commissioners alleged abuses of power to the
State Administrative Court instead of the Criminal Court. 254 Furthermore,
he stated that if he were the President, he would remove the Chief of
National Police. 255 After the press conference, Chief Justice Mahfud met
with the President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono privately and tried to
convince the President to drop the case because the Police had no basis to
incriminate the Commissioners of the Anti-Corruption Commission. 256
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Surprisingly, the former Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie criticized
Mahfud for his media interview and his effort to lobby the President.
Asshiddiqie stated that it was inappropriate for Chief Justice Mahfud to
criticize the Chief of National Police in the media. 257 Asshidiqie’s criticism
was ironic because he essentially criticized his own strategy. Consequently,
it was easy for Mahfud to rebut Asshiddiqie, saying that he was just
following in the footsteps of his predecessor, who was very active in the
media and in lobbying the President.258 Mahfud further argued that he had
to speak to the media to appeal for public support because the Court lacked
authority to stop the criminal investigation.259
Chief Justice Mahfud continued to give media interviews in the
Mohammad Sholeh Case.260 Mohammad Sholeh was a legislative candidate
from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). He challenged
the constitutionality of the Legislative Election Law, which ruled that the
candidate with the highest-ranking position on the candidate list shall be
elected as legislator. 261 The Court accepted his argument and declared the
rules unconstitutional. The General Election Commission, however, refused
to comply with the Court’s decision. Chief Justice Mahfud issued a press
statement and warned the Election Commission that there would be political
and criminal consequences for all commissioners who refused to comply
with the Court’s decision.262 He argued that the situation forced him to
speak out to the media; otherwise the General Election Commission would
have never followed the Court’s decision. 263
During his tenure as Chief Justice, Mahud gave many media
interviews on politically sensitive issues and on the cases pending before the
Constitutional Court.
In 2011, Chief Justice Mahfud was named
Newsmaker of the Year by Seputar Indonesia, a news program broadcast by
257
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private television station RCTI. 264 Chief Justice Mahfud’s extra-judicial
strategies, which included frequent media interviews, indicated that the
Court still needed the leadership of a heroic Chief Justice to deal with the
pressure from the government and other political actors. Without it, the
government might have continued to ignore or disrespect the Court’s
decisions. Therefore, the Chief Justice must sometimes act outside of the
courtroom, opening up confrontation with the government.
D.

The Corruption Scandals

One of the biggest challenges for Mahfud during his tenure as the
Chief Justice was his Court’s several alleged corruption scandals. These
scandals brought serious challenges to his legitimacy as the Chief Justice of
the Constitutional Court. One of the high profile scandals involved
Associate Justice Mohammad Arsyad and centered on allegations that he
manipulated the Court’s decision in a regional election dispute. In 2009, the
Court examined a dispute over the Head of Regency Election in South
Bengkulu. A candidate for the position, Nirwan Mahmud, bribed both
Arsyad’s daughter and Arsyad’s brother-in-law to convince Justice Arsyad
to sway the Court’s decision in Mahmud’s favor. Justice Arsyad admitted
that his daughter indeed met the candidate; however, he denied that his
daughter had introduced the candidate to him. 265
Chief Justice Mahfud handled the scandal well. He decided to
establish an independent ethics council which examined Arsyad’s
involvement in the affair. The Ethics Council found evidence of a meeting
between the candidate and Arsyad’s daughter and brother-in-law. Moreover,
the Council also found that Arsyad’s family members had held meetings
with Arsyad’s law clerk afterward. The Council concluded that Arsyad
violated the judiciary code of ethics because he failed to stop his family
members from making a deal with parties involved in cases being handled
by the Court. Arsyad maintained that he did not commit any crime;
nevertheless, he tendered his resignation and left the Court in disgrace.266
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A few months after Arsyad left office, a new scandal surfaced. While
he was in office, Arsyad was allegedly involved in the forgery of a letter that
gave a seat of the House of Representatives to a losing candidate. 267 The
scandal arose from the General Election dispute in 2009 between a politician
from the People’s Conscience Party (Hanura), Dewi Yasin Limpo, and a
politician from the Greater Indonesian movement (Gerindra), Mestariani
Habie. The Constitutional Court officially ruled that the seat should be
given to Habie, yet Justice Arsyad collaborated with the Law Clerk to forge
a letter to award a House of Representatives seat to the losing candidate,
Dewi Yasin Limpo. 268 Chief Justice Mahfud decided to conduct an internal
investigation into the case and found indications that Arsyad, the law clerk,
and a commissioner of the General Election Commission had collaborated to
forge the document awarding the seat to a losing candidate. Chief Justice
Mahfud then reported Arsyad’s alleged involvement to the police.
The disgraced Justice Arsyad launched a counter attack. First, he
revealed how Chief Justice Mahfud lobbied him rigorously to vote against
Chief Asshiddiqie in the election of Chief Justice in 2008. He then
apologized to Chief Justice Asshiddiqe for siding with Mahfud and creating
a plot to dethrone Asshiddqie. 269 Second, Arsyad accused Mahfud of being
an incompetent Chief Justice because he neglected the Court’s
administration and focused too much on building his popularity outside of
court activities.270 Lastly, Justice Arsyad accused Mahfud of breaching the
judiciary code of ethics when Mahfud held a private meeting with an AntiCorruption Commissioner, Bibit Riyanto, and his lawyer while the Court
was reviewing his case. 271 The truth behind Arsyad’s accusations remains
unknown; nevertheless, Arsyad’s scandals and his counter attack tainted the
reputation of Chief Justice Mahfud.
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The Mahfud Court at Twilight

On June 21, 2011, the House of Representatives enacted the
Amendment of the Constitutional Court Law. 272 The amendment process
itself went largely unnoticed, and thus, it created an impression that the
House wanted to avoid public discourse on the amendment. 273 The new Law
established the Honorary Council of Judges of the Constitutional Court,
which aimed to supervise the performance of the Constitutional Court
Justices. The council members included some members of the House of
Representative. 274 The new law also prescribed that the Court’s judgment
should not exceed what a claimant requested.275 The then Minister of Law
and Human Rights, Patrialis Akbar, explained that the Court would be
forbidden from deciding a matter it has not been asked to make a decision
upon, such as the nullification of a whole statute.276 Moreover, the Law
reduced the tenure of Chief Justice to two years and six months, implying
that the House wanted to have more control over the Court.277 The decision
to reduce the term of Chief Justice signified that that position is quite
important. By reducing the term of Chief Justice, the House wanted to
minimize the position’s influence on Indonesian constitutional politics.
Chief Justice Mahfud responded positively to the new law and stated
that the Court would accept it without reservation.278 Moreover, Mahfud
denied the possibility that the Court could review the new law. He
reaffirmed his old taboos that the Court should recuse itself when it had selfinterest in certain cases that involved the Court’s authority. 279 One plausible
explanation for Mahfud’s compliance with the new law is that he was
272

Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 8 of 2011, on the Amendment of Law No. 24 of 2003 on
the Constitutional Court, art. 27A(2).
273
Revisi UU MK Cermin Ketakutan DPR [Amendment of the Constitutional Court Law Indicates the
Fear of the Legislators], POLMARK INDONESIA, (June 22, 2011), http://www.polmarkindonesia.com/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2338.
274
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 8 of 2011, on the Amendment of Law No. 24 of 2003 on
the Constitutional Court, art. 27A(2).
275
Id. art. 45A.
276
Dina Indrasafitri, Minister lauds new constitutional court bill, JAKARTA POST (June 4, 2011),
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/06/14/minister-lauds-new-constitutional-court-bill.html.
277
Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 8 of 2011, on the Amendment of Law No. 24 of 2003 on
the Constitutional Court, art. 4(2).
278
Soal Revisi UU MK, Mahfud MD Bilang Terserah, [With Regard to the Amendment of the
Constitutional Court Law, Mahfud Says Whatever], REPUBLIKA (June 21, 2011), http://www.republika.co.
id/berita/nasional/hukum/11/06/21/ln4kil-soal-revisi-uu-mk-mahfud-md-bilang-terserah.
279
Mahfud: MK Hormati Revisi UU MK [Mahfud: The Court Respects the Amendment of the
Constitutional Court Law], KOMPAS (June 22, 2011), http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/06/22/005713
96/Mahfud.MK.Hormati.Revisi.UU.MK.

545

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 3

seeking re-election as the Chief Justice. In August 2011, Chief Justice
Mahfud had to run for re-election, so he once again implemented judicial
restraint in order to please the Executive and Legislative branches.
During his tenure as Chief Justice, Mahfud seemed to maintain good
relations with his fellow judges and therefore did not face strong resistance
during his re-election. The Government also appeared tolerant of Mahfud’s
behavior on the bench, and, consequently, Mahfud was reelected to be the
Chief Justice until 2014.280 It was therefore surprising when, in November
2012, Mahfud told the House of Representative that he intended to leave his
job in April 2013.
There were rumors that Mahfud was a potential candidate for
president in the 2014 election. 281 Therefore, his decision to resign, some
believe, was part of his larger plan to run for president. In response to the
rumors, Chief Justice Mahfud said, “That is part of democracy. So let it be .
. . .” 282 On April 1, 2013, Chief Justice Mahfud officially resigned from the
Court and reaffirmed his aspiration to run in the presidential race. “If the
opportunity is really there, I am ready to be nominated as a presidential
candidate,” said Mahfud on his last day at the Court.283 Mahfud’s
presidential ambitions indicate that the position of Chief Justice is indeed
important in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. Mahfud has earned fame
following his involvement in politically sensitive cases, frequent media
interviews, and activities outside the courtroom. In other words, Mahfud
earned his fame by following in the footsteps of his predecessor Jimly
Asshiddiqie, who played a role as a heroic Chief Justice.
Mahfud’s party, the National Awakening Party (PKB) had, indeed,
considered him as a potential candidate for the 2014 presidential election.
Unfortunately, the PKB only garnered 9.04 % of popular vote (i.e. 8.39 % of
seats), which is far below the presidential threshold. 284 Having realized that
it would not be able to nominate Mahfud as president, the PKB buried
280
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Mahfud’s presidential ambition and decided to join the coalition that
nominated the Governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo as president.285 Mahfud
could not hide his disappointment and decided to support Widodo’s rival, a
retired three star general, Prabowo Subianto. In a dramatic turn, he accepted
an offer to become the head of Subianto’s election campaign.
In the presidential election that took place on July 9, 2014, Joko
Widodo, commonly known as Jokowi, defeated his archrival Prabowo
Subianto. Widodo received 53.1 percent of the votes (71 million) and his
opponent received 46.85 per cent (62.5 million). Mahfud admitted that he
had failed to deliver victory for Prabowo Subianto. Subianto, however,
refused to concede and claimed that he had been denied victory by fraud and
immediately challenged the election result in the Constitutional Court. Soon
after the General Election Commission announced the official results of the
2014 presidential election, former Chief Justice Mahfud resigned from his
position as chairman of the Subianto’s presidential campaign team. 286
VI.

MISCARRIAGE OF CHIEF JUSTICE: THE TRAGIC FALL OF AKIL MOCHTAR

On April 3, 2013, the Court elected Akil Mochtar as the new Chief
Justice for the period of 2013–2015. Mochtar had no towering academic
credential like his predecessors; he was a politician from Golkar Party, the
former ruling party under the military dictatorship. He began to serve as the
member of the House of Representative after the fall of military government
in 1998. In his second term as the member of the House, he served as the
Deputy Chairman of the House of Judiciary Committee. 287
In 2007, Akil Mochtar ran for West Kalimantan governor and lost.
But his failure in that election became a turning point for his political
aspirations. In his bid for governor, Mochtar went against his own party
candidate, the then Governor Usman Djafar. Thus, Golkar Party officials
saw Mochtar as a traitor that split Golkar’s vote, which resulted in his
285
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loss.288 Having realized that he would never be nominated for legislative
candidacy again by Golkar, Mochtar lobbied politicians for consideration to
be appointed as a Constitutional Court justice. Five years later, he became
the third Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court. 289
Akil Mochtar’s election is rather puzzling for many people, especially
considering his poor record. Akil Mochtar had long been suspected of
involvement in corrupt activity while on the Constitutional Court. In 2010,
he was linked to a bribery scandal that related to a case involving an election
dispute in the Simalungun district. Refly Harun, the lawyer of the Head of
Simalungun District accused Mochtar of receiving money from his client in
exchange for a promise of a favorable decision in return. 290 The then-Chief
Justice Mahfud established an independent ethics council to investigate the
allegation. The Ethics Council, however, did not find any incriminating
evidence and cleared Mochtar of all charges. Three years later, Mochtar
could not escape from corruption charges when the Anti-Corruption
Commission arrived with a warrant for his arrest and confiscated
approximately USD 260,000 from his residence. The money was allegedly
given so Mochtar would rule the Gunung Mas regional election dispute in
the incumbent’s favor. 291
So why did the Constitutional Court Justices elect Akil Mochtar as the
third Chief Justice? One of the plausible explanations is that Akil Mochtar
was not the sole perpetrator involved in the corruption scandals. Budiman
Tanuredjo, the chief editor of Kompas, the leading daily newspaper in
Indonesia, wrote a detailed report on the involvement of Akil Mochtar in
multiple bribery offences in regional election disputes.292 Under the tenure
of Chief Justice Mahfud, Mochtar sat on the same panel of judges with
Justice Hamdan Zoelva and Justice Mohammad Alim that was equipped
with the task of examining some regional election dispute cases.293
Tanuredjo reported that in many instances Akil Mochtar received a bribe for
288
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the Court to rule in favor of certain candidates.294 The question is how
Mochtar could steer the Court decision without the knowledge of his
brethren who sat on the same panel. After he became the Chief Justice,
Mochtar shuffled the panel of judges that examine the regional election
disputes. Mochyar assigned himself to sit in a panel of judges with Justice
Maria Farida and Justice Anwar Usman. 295 Tanuredjo reported that Mochtar
received multiple bribes to issue a favorable ruling to certain candidates.296
These facts lead into two different conclusions: first, Mochtar steered the
Court’s decision in collaboration with his fellow justices who sat on the
same panel; second, he received bribes alone, but he was able to use his
insider position to advocate strongly for certain positions while the other
judges were oblivious. 297
The tenure of Akil Mochtar as Chief Justice was short. He reigned
from April 3, 2013 until his arrest on October 2, 2013. The arrest not only
has tarnished the Court’s reputation but also eroded the Court’s legitimacy.
Shortly after Mochtar’s arrest, an angry crowd ransacked the courtroom
where a trial was being held.298 At that time, eight justices were reading out
a verdict concerning a dispute of Governor Election in Maluku province.
The supporters of the losing candidate stormed the courtroom and the
justices immediately exited the courtroom after one of the angry supporters
hurled a microphone at them. Obviously, the attack signified the lack of
trust from general public. There would be a long way to go for the Court to
rebuild its reputation.
The disgrace of Akil Mochtar reached its climax on June 30, 2014
when the Jakarta Anti-Corruption Court sentenced him to life
imprisonment. 299 The Court found that Mochtar was guilty of corruption
and money laundering during his tenure as an associate justice and Chief
Justice, between 2010 and 2013. The tragic episode of Akil Mochtar
signifies an important moment in the history of the Indonesian
294
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Constitutional Court. The Chief Justice holds a crucial position in the
Indonesian constitutional constellation. In his capacity as the Chief Justice,
Akil Mochtar was the personification of the Court, and thus, the public could
easily equate his personal crimes with the Court. Prior to the fall of Akil
Mochtar, the Court had a reputation as a transparent and functioning
institution. Mochtar’s arrest, however, led the public to perceive the Court
as another corrupt legal institution in the country, similar to the Supreme
Court or the Attorney General’s office.
VII. WILTING BEFORE BLOOMING: THE HAMDAN ZOELVA COURT
After the arrest of Akil Mochtar, the Deputy Chief Justice Hamdan
Zoelva took over the leadership of the Constitutional Court, and
subsequently was elected as the fourth Chief Justice of the Constitutional
Court on November 1, 2013. Zoelva is a politician from the Star and
Crescent party. Like the first two Chief Justices who have strong Islamic
backgrounds, Zoelva also has strong ties with political Islam. His party, the
Star and Crescent Party, claims that it is the continuation of Council of
Indonesian Muslim Associations (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia
or Masyumi), a major Islamic political party in Indonesia in 1950s.300 When
the party was re-established in 1999 after the fall of Suharto regime, the
original plan was to use the Masyumi name again, but after consideration,
they settled on the Crescent Star Party. 301 Zoelva used to hold many
strategic positions in the party. He was the Secretary of Star and Crescent
caucus in the House of Representative from 1999 to 2004 and was a member
of its Executive Committee. 302 He resigned from the Party after President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono nominated him as an associate Justice of the
Constitutional Court in 2010.303
When Hamdan Zoelva was inaugurated on November 6, 2013, he
inherited a court in crisis. The biggest challenge for Zoelva was restoring
public confidence in the Court after the tragic fall of his immediate
predecessor. The first test for Chief Justice Zoelva’s leadership was in the
Presidential Threshold Case, in which the Court had to decide the
300
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constitutionality of presidential threshold requirements. 304 This was even
more significant because Zoelva’s appointment as the Chief Justice had
drawn criticism from some political activists who believed that his
background as a politician would only serve to weaken the public’s waning
trust toward the Court. 305 This concern was based on the fact that a number
of the Star and Crescent Party officials frequently argued before the Court.
The founder of the Star and Crescent Party, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a highprofile lawyer and former Minister of Justice often argued before the
Constitutional Court.306 In the Presidential Threshold Case, many critics
expressed concern that Chief Justice Zoelva might try to steer the Court
decision in favor of Mahendra.
The case arose because on December 8, 2013, Mahendra announced
his candidacy for the presidency despite his party having no seats in the
House and little prospect of fulfilling either the seat or popular vote
threshold in the 2014 legislative election.307 According to the Presidential
Election Law, a presidential candidate shall be nominated by a political
party or a coalition of political parties who hold at least twenty percent seats
in the House of Representatives or obtain at least twenty-five percent of the
popular vote in the legislative election. 308 On December 13, 2013,
Mahendra launched a legal challenge in the Constitutional Court to enable
him to run for president on his party’s ticket, the Star and Crescent Party.
In his petition, Mahendra postulated that the Constitution did not
specify any threshold for the presidential election. Mahendra referred to the
Constitutional provisions that states, “each ticket of presidential candidates
shall be proposed prior to the holding of general elections by political parties
or coalitions of political parties which are participants in the general
elections.”309 Mahendra asserted that there were twelve political parties in
304
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the 2014 election, and, therefore, he urged the Court to declare that all of
these parties have the right to nominate their candidates for president.310
On March 20, 2014, the Court issued a decision that addressed
Mahendra’s complaint. The Court considered that Mahendra had requested
the Court to issue an advisory opinion in regards to the meaning of article
6(2) of the Constitution. The Court made a distinction between a declaratory
judgment and an advisory opinion; the former aims to resolve concrete
controversies and the latter does not.311 The Court held that it had no
authority to issue an advisory opinion, and thus that it could not grant
Mahendra’s petition.312 The Court’s decision signaled that it was on the
verge of abandoning its old approach. Previously, under both the
Assiddiqhie Court and the Mahfud Court, the Court had not been reluctant to
issue opinions in similar cases. The decision was a signal that the Zoelva
Court believed that the Court should play a minimal role in politicallycharged cases.
The Court continued to signal its preference for judicial restraint in
the recent Regional Election Dispute Case. 313 The Zoelva Court was also
fully aware that the Court’s reputation has been tarnished by many scandals
that originated from regional election disputes. After the arrest of Chief
Justice Mochtar, many constitutional stakeholders began to urge the
President and the House of Representatives to reevaluate the Court’s
authority to handle these disputes. Nonetheless, neither the President nor the
House took any steps to address the issue. The Zoelva Court thus took the
issue into its own hands in its decision in this case.
The case originated from a claim made by a group of NGOs, chiefly
led by the Law and Constitutional Assessment Forum (Forum Kajian
Hukum dan Konstitutsi). The claimants posited that the Constitution only
equipped the Court with authority to handle national election disputes, not
regional election disputes. 314 Based on this presupposition, the Claimant
concluded that the Court’s authority to handle regional election disputes was
unconstitutional.
310
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The claimants also put forward a claim that the Court had shifted their
energy and resources to handling the regional election disputes instead of
statutory review. According to the claimants, the Court’s new priority
caused immediate harm to them because it lessened their ability to bring
successful statutory review cases.315 The nature of the claim was very
abstract and the petitioners were asking the Court to reevaluate its own
authority to handle regional election disputes.
The Court’s majority sustained the claimant’s petition and held that
the drafters of the Constitution never intended to include the election of the
Governor and the head of district (Bupati) within the textual phrase “general
election.”316 The Court ruled that the drafters only intended to include the
presidential election and the legislative election, including the members of
the national parliament and the regional parliament. 317 The Court thus held
that many regional election disputes are not within the scope of its
authority. 318
This case marked the second time in less than a year that the Zoelva
Court minimized its role in constitutional politics. The Zoelva Court’s
approach is a contrast to both the Assidhiddiqie Court and the Mahfud
Court. The Zoelva Court understood that the regional election dispute has
created a tremendous burden for the institution. The Court had been
overwhelmed with the regional election disputes on top of a recent influx in
statutory review cases. From 2003 through 2008, the Court only received an
average of twenty-five statutory review cases per year; however, since 2008
the Court has received an average of eighty statutory review cases per year.
In addition, the Court must also handle a large number of national legislative
election disputes every five years. In the recent 2014 legislative election, the
Court received 702 national legislative election disputes. 319 Thus, the
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Zoelva Court decided to remove regional election disputes from its docket
entirely.
The latest evidence of the Court’s advocacy for judicial restraint is the
Court decision in the MD3 Case.320 The Case involved judicial review over
Law No. 17 of 2014 on Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah dan Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat Daerah—the People’s Consultative Assembly, People’s
Representative Council and Regional Representative Council, and Regional
People Representative Council (“MD3 Law”). The crux of the matter in this
case was whether the winner of parliamentary election shall hold the
position of the House Speaker.
In 2010, the Yudhoyono administration prepared the MD3 bill, aiming
to address several issues such as the reorganization of the Regional
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD). 321 Since its
inception ten years ago, the DPD has been considered the weak second
chamber because its authority is limited to discussions of how a prospective
bill relates to regional issues. The second important issue that the bill aimed
to address was the immunity of the members of the House of
Representatives. According to the Anti-Corruption Commission, more than
seventy-five members of parliament were detained and declared suspects in
corruption cases in the previous seven years.322 The pressing issue that the
bill aimed to address was how to balance the effort to combat corruption and
the immunity of the members of parliament.
The MD3 Bill stalled for almost four years, until an emerging political
situation in the wake of the April 2014 Parliamentary Election revived the
bill. After the 2014 Parliamentary Election, Prabowo Subianto and his RedWhite Coalition, which controlled sixty percent of the seats in the
Parliament, began to see an opportunity to manipulate the MD3 bill for their
interest. The main agenda of the Red-White coalition was to control the
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leadership of the House. 323 According to the old MD3 Law No. 27 of 2009,
“the House Speaker shall be a member of the political party that garners the
largest vote in the legislative election.” 324 As the winner of the 2014
Legislative Election, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)
was supposed to hold the Speaker seat. But the PDI-P had to face a big
disappointment when the Red-White Coalition manipulated the MD3 bill
during the lame duck session of the Parliament. The Red-White Coalition
successfully inserted an amendment that stipulated the House Speaker shall
be elected by the members of the House. 325 On July 8, 2014, the House
passed the new MD3 Law and it went largely unnoticed as all the eyes were
focusing on the presidential election that took place a day later. The
Chairwoman of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle’s (PDI-P),
Megawati Soekarnoputri and two PDI-P lawmakers filed a claim to the
Court and asserted that they were unfairly treated by the new law. 326 The
Chief of the PDI-P legal team stated, “Within only a month, they amended
the Legislative Institution Law, so now the House speaker position doesn’t
automatically belong to the election winner.” 327
The Zoelva Court again exercised judicial restraint. First, the Court
held that the PDI-P and its Chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri had no
standing to file the case because they simply disagreed with the enactment of
the Law. 328 Moreover, the Court held that the PDI-P was involved in
discussing the bill in the House, which means that they already had a chance
to express their disagreement during the deliberation process. 329 On the
merits of the case, the Court decided it is the province of the legislature to
decide on how to choose leaders in legislative branch of government. 330
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The Court's holding on standing did not alter the Court’s recognition
of generalized grievances standing; nonetheless, it signaled a slight
departure from the Court’s standing precedent. The Asshiddiqie’s Court
used the standing doctrine as an avenue to review governmental policies.
The Mahfud Court in some ways continued to apply a similar strategy and it
did not see any need to alter the Asshiddiqie Court’s standing doctrine. The
Zoelva Court, however, turned towards judicial restraint and it had no
inclination to play a tug of war with the President or the Parliament, as was
done by previous Courts. By holding that the PDI-P has no standing
because already participated in the deliberation process in the House, the
Zoelva Court indicated that the Court would not trespass the authority of
legislative branch.
The 2014 General Election has provided many opportunities for the
Court and Chief Justice Hamdan Zoelva to play important roles in
Indonesian Constitutional politics. These opportunities in some ways have
become a blessing in disguise for Chief Justice Hamdan Zoelva to raise his
own profile, especially in the recent Presidential Election Dispute case. On
July 22, 2014, the General Election Commission declared Jokowi and his
running mate Jusuf Kalla as the Presidential Election winners by a margin of
8.5 million votes. The defeated candidate, Prabowo Subianto, however,
refused to concede and claimed that he had been denied victory by fraud and
immediately challenged the election result in the Constitutional Court.331
Having spent more than three weeks reviewing the case, the Court rejected
all of Subianto’s complaints and ruled that there was no evidence of
systematic and massive electoral fraud in favor of Widodo.332
The Court decision in the Presidential Election disputes has elevated
Chief Justice Zoelva to a very public position. Zoelva’s leading role in
presiding over the trial has won not only praise by political observers, who
called him “the man of the hour” as the Court handed down its verdict that
day, it has also transformed him into a social media darling. 333 For example,
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Zoleva raised to prominence among social media users for his appearance
after the Court rendered its decision.334
Prior to the Court’s decision in the Presidential Dispute, many critics
were skeptical that the Court would be impartial in reviewing the case.335
The concerns were based on the fact that Zoelva was a member of the Star
and Crescent Party that supported the losing candidate Prabowo Subianto.
In addition to Zoelva, Justice Patrialis Akbar was a member the National
Mandate Party (PAN) and the Chairman of PAN, Hatta Rajasa was the
running mate of Prabowo Subianto. Therefore, there was a concern that
Chief Justice Zoelva, with some help from Justice Patrialis Akbar, might
steer the Court decision in favor of Prabowo Subianto. Chief Justice Zoelva
responded to the critics: “Whatever I said, people would not believe me. I
had said repeatedly that the Court would be independent, but no one
believed us.” 336 Indeed, Chief Justice Zoelva turned the skepticism into
delight by proving his impartiality.
The rise of Chief Justice Zoelva in the public consciousness signifies
that the position of Chief Justice is important in Indonesian Constitutional
politics. The public still believes that the Chief Justice is the personification
of the Court, moreover, people have a perception that the Chief Justice
might be able to steer the Court decision in a certain direction. Although the
Chief Justice does not have as much power as the public imagines, the Chief
Justice can still influence the path that Court will take.
Despite the success of Chief Justice Zoelva in repairing the Court’s
image, the Court has been unable to fully recover from the major setback
caused by Akil Mochtar. First, the Court’s advocacy of judicial restraint
may be a sign of weakness, that Chief Justice Zoelva did not believe the
court had the strength to overrule the Executive and Legislature. Second,
the Court’s decision that upheld Jokowi’s electoral victory could also be
interpreted as a sign of weakness because the Court was simply affirming a
popular electoral result. Lastly, Chief Justice Zoelva’s advocacy of judicial
334
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restraint did not help him to secure his position, as the new President Jokowi
decided not to re-appoint him for a second term. Furthermore, Chief Justice
Zoelva had to endure a humiliating experience in his effort to cling to his
position.337
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed Hamdan Zoelva as
an associate Justice on January 7, 2010, which means that he would finish
his first-five year term on January 7, 2015.338 As Chief Justice Zoelva
approached the end of his first five-year term, the Jokowi administration
hinted that Chief Justice Zoelva would not be re-appointed for his second
term. 339 On November 11, 2014, President Jokowi established a selection
committee to find a successor for Hamdan Zoelva. Chief Justice Zoelva
implied that he was prepared to be reappointed if Jokowi wanted him to keep
the position. When the selection committee opened a public competition for
Zoelva’s position, Zoelva put aside his ego and applied for his position.
Chief Justice Zoelva soon realized that the Jokowi administration
would not give him an easy pass when the selection committee called him
for an interview. Zoelva sent a letter stating his objection to attend the
interview with the selection committee. He said he had already fulfilled the
requirement to serve on the bench when he was interviewed to become an
associate Justice in 2010.340 The selection committee maintained that Chief
Justice Zoelva would not receive any special treatment and he could not take
any shortcuts. The committee finally decided to drop the bid of Chief Justice
Hamdan Zoelva. 341 This episode suggests that the Court was indeed weak
337
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because Chief Justice Zoelva had to show submissive respect to the Jokowi
administration, which eventually failed to save him from the sad ending.
Some politicians and analysts accused Zoelva of not acting like a
statesman in the battle over his appointment, as he simply wanted to cling on
to his position as Chief Justice. 342 Regardless of the motivation behind his
decision to fight against the Jokowi administration, Zoelva raised some
important concerns over the Constitutional Court’s institutional design.
Before he left the office, Chief Justice Zoelva urged lawmakers to reform the
term limit for Constitutional Court justices and Chief Justice.343 He argued
that a longer term limit is necessary to preserve judicial independence.
There is some truth in Zoelva’s proposal because if the appointment term is
longer, the constitutional court judges would likely be more independent in
exercising their authority.
On January 12, 2015, the Constitutional Court Justices unanimously
elected Arief Hidayat, a lesser-known academic from Diponegoro
University, as the fifth Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
As the new Chief Justice, Arief Hidayat must reflect on what his future will
look like and whether his career will end up like his predecessors. It appears
that Arief Hidayat did not learn any lessons from his predecessors. Just
barely one year in his tenure as Chief Justice, Hidayat shocked the public
with indications of an ethics violation. 344 Hidayat allegedly wrote a memo
to Widyono Pramono, the then Assistant Attorney General for Special Crime
concerning Hidayat’s recommendation for Pramono’s promotion for
becoming a Professor at the University of Diponegoro Law School, where
Hidayat used to be the Dean. In return, Hidayat requested for a special
treatment of his “family member,” Zainur Rochman an assistant District
Attorney at Trenggalek Regency, East Java. 345
The Ethics Council then moved to investigate the allegations of an
ethics violation. Hidayat admitted before the Ethics Council that he did
342
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write the letter, but that he never intended to seek a special treatment for his
“relative” who happened to be an assistant District Attorney. 346 Hidayat
argued that he simply wrote in the letter, “I am entrusting you (Promono) to
take him (Rochman) under your wing and to treat him like your son.”347
According to Hidayat, what he meant by those words was a simple request
for Pramono to be a mentor for Rochman in terms of improving his skill and
knowledge as a young prosecutor.348
The Ethics Council was puzzled by some of its findings, such as that
Hidayat and Rochmat had just met in 2015 and they did not have any
familial relationship. 349 The Ethics Council ruled that the Chief Justice
acted imprudently by writing a recommendation for someone whom he just
knew briefly. 350 Furthermore, the Ethics Council ruled that the issuance of
the letter was an unwise decision because it might create negative
perceptions.351 Nevertheless, the Ethics Council did not find any gross
ethical violations as Hidayat was acting in good faith to help a young
assistant district attorney to gain some skill and knowledge.352 On March
2016, the Ethics Council came out with a recommendation that Chief Justice
Hidayat be given private warning (sanksi teguran).353
Regardless of the result of the Ethics Council’s investigation,
obviously, Hidayat succumbed to alleged ethics violations, which could lead
to a humiliating end of his career. Although he did survive the investigation
of the Ethics Council, he has tarnished the reputation of the Court that he
leads. As previously argued, the Chief Justice is the personification of the
Court, and the public could easily equate Hidayat’s alleged ethical violations
with the Court. Hidayat will remain as the Chief Justice at least until 2017,
but memories remain fresh enough for the public to perceive the
Constitutional Court as yet another untrustworthy legal institution in the
country.
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VII. CONCLUSION
When Indonesian politicians decided to establish the Constitutional
Court in 2001, they did not intend to create a robust judicial entity. The
Court’s structural design clearly indicates half-hearted commitment to
judicial power among politicians when they established the Court. They
designed the Court with limited authority, such that the Court could only
review abstract cases and provide declaratory remedies. The politicians also
showed lukewarm support when the Court opened for business in 2003. The
executive and lawmakers did not provide sufficient logistical support for the
Court and therefore it was without any money, an office building, and
necessary staff upon its inception. They opposed the proposal to build a new
office building and the Court did not have a permanent office until 2007.
Though political leaders intended the Court to be an innocuous
creature, under Asshidique’s leadership it became something of a
Frankenstein’s Monster possessed of the capacity to stand up against its
creator. It became uncontrollable. Led by Asshidique, the Court struck
down many governmental policies. It pushed the government to respect the
protection of civil and political rights. Moreover, it even aggressively
confronted the government to follow the Court’s decisions. Asshiddiqie was
not the government’s man, but was rather a maverick Chief Justice who led
the Court to expand its authority and fought for its equal status with the
other branches of government.
One of the components to Asshidiqie’s success in leadership was his
capacity to use the limited resources that were available to increase the
power of the Constitutional Court. The Court’s authority to exercise abstract
review seemed to be a weakness for the Court because its job was simply to
answer the constitutional questions presented to it. Asshiddiqie, however,
turned this handicap into a powerful force in which he used abstract review
to evaluate many governmental policies. Under Asshiddiqie’s leadership,
the Court struck down legislation and directed the government to correct
several of its policies.
Asshididqie continued to enhance the Court’s authority through his
strategy related to questions of judicial standing, which filled an existing
doctrinal gap with a broad vision of who may bring a case before the
judiciary. His expansive views on standing allowed plaintiffs to file
petitions as taxpayers or consumers, and even bestowed standing on NGOs.
Asshiddiqie believed that if the Court did not craft broad standing rules, then
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many important cases would not come before the Court for review. He was
convinced that the Court had a role to play in solving political and economic
problems in Indonesia’s democratic transition and therefore the generous
view of standing enabled the Court to review many cases implicating
political and economic issues in the transition.
The Court’s aggressive approach aroused opposition in other branches
of government and they tried to find ways to undermine the Court’s
authority. Though at first Jimly Asshiddiqie appeared to be the Indonesian
judicial version of Frankenstein’s Monster, in the end he was easily
overpowered. The ouster of Asshiddiqie, indeed, signified the fragility of
the newly established Constitutional Court. Through this experience it
became clear that the weakest point of the Court is the limited terms of the
associate justices and the Chief Justice. With such limited terms, the justices
have to face the reality that their terms may not be renewed if they fail to
please other elements of the government. Moreover, the Chief Justice also
sits on the bench with additional insecurity, since he or she might not be reelected to the position of Chief Justice if he or she fails to please the
government or the other associate justices.
The departure of Jimly Asshiddiqie, however, did not automatically
bring to an end the “conundrum” posed by a heroic Chief Justice. His
successor, Mohammad Mahfud came with a vision of judicial restraint, and
indeed his Court tended to defer to the government on some major policy
issues. Nevertheless, Mahfud was unable to avoid the reality that his Court
must review some governmental policies and offer directions to the
government on correcting its policies when necessary. He also had to follow
the footsteps of his predecessor in defending and promoting the Court’s
decisions through extrajudicial strategies such as media interviews and
public statements on sensitive topics.
The paradox of judicial leadership in the Indonesian Constitutional
Court is that the Court cannot avoid politically sensitive cases because it has
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of laws and government policies.
The Court will always deal with constitutional issues that have powerful
impact on the political realm. Consequently, the Court needs the leadership
of a heroic Chief Justice who can command the institution in the sometimes
stormy waters of constitutional politics. Chief Justices Ashiddiqie and
Mahfud might be gone from the Constitutional Court, but their leadership
examples remain relevant and necessary for the fragile Constitutional Court
that still needs a heroic Chief Justice at its helm.
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Although Asshiddiqie and Mahfud were dissimilar in many ways,
they had similar political trajectories. Both Asshiddiqie and Mahfud had
been constitutional law professors with deep Islamic roots before they were
thrust into the role of Chief Justice. They both had established decorated
political careers before they came to the bench. Both of them retained their
interest in politics while they were sitting on the bench and they deployed
some aggressive strategies in dealing with the different branches of
government. When they saw disregard for their decisions, they tried to
launch a counter attack and push the executive and legislators to comply
with their decision. They both played the role of the heroic Chief Justice
ready to solve the social and political problems in the country.
Asshiddiqie’s aggressive approach aroused opposition in other
branches of government and they tried to find ways to undermine the
Court’s authority. The government did not have direct power to remove the
Chief Justice; nevertheless, it could support rival justices to replace
Asshiddiqie.
Those new justices were the ones who challenged
Asshiddiqie’s leadership and ousted him from his leadership position.
Unlike his predecessor, Mahfud was able to survive and he managed to
reduce any risk of attack. He retained some trust from his fellow associate
justices that enabled him to finish his term as Chief Justice. Nevertheless,
Mahfud did not shy from showing his ambition to run as a presidential
contender, which eventually led to his early departure from the Court.
In both cases, the stars of Asshiddiqie and Mahfud were dimming
after their departure as they both failed to return to power after they tried to
obtain their political aspirations. Asshiddiqie failed to secure the top post of
Anti-Corruption Commission and Mahfud could not secure the presidential
nomination. In his attempt at a political career comeback, Mahfud took a
job as the Head Campaign Manager for a Presidential Candidate, Prabowo
Subianto. But Mahfud’s political comeback quickly diminished after
Subianto suffered a humiliating defeat in the 2014 presidential election.
Finally, the short tenures of Akil Mochtar and Hamdan Zoelva proved
the Chief Justice still holds a crucial position in the Indonesian constitutional
constellation. As the Chief Justice, Akil Mochtar was the personification of
the Court and the public easily equated his personal crimes with the Court.
His arrest immediately led public perception to put the Court in the same
level as other corrupt legal institutions in the country. The public skepticism
over the election of Chief Justice Zoelva reaffirms the importance of Chief
Justice in the Indonesian Constitutional politics. The public still has a
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perception that the Chief Justice might be able to steer the Court’s decisions
in a certain direction. When Chief Justice Zoelva turned the public
skepticism into delight by proving his impartiality, the public immediately
stood behind him. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Zoelva could not continue to
play the role of a heroic Chief Justice. During his short tenure, Zoelva
pursued a path of judicial restraint, underscoring the Court’s weakness in
relation to other branches of government. Moreover, his advocacy of judicial
restraint failed him in the long run as it did not secure his position on the
Court. As President Jokowi decided not to re-appoint Hamdan Zoelva, he
was forced to exit the Court in a sad ending like his predecessors.
More than a decade after its inception, the Indonesian Constitutional
Court still needs a heroic Chief Justice who can lead the institution in
navigating the “stormy seas” of constitutional politics in Indonesia. The
professional profile and background of a Chief Justice is one of the key
factors that affect the rise and fall of judicial power in the Indonesian
Constitutional Court. With frequent configuration changes due to normal or
irregular mechanisms in the Court, there are no longer any judicial heroes
available. Under this circumstance, the Court and its Chief Justice must
decide whether it will continue to be an engine for change, or whether it will
allow itself to be limited to the small scope envisioned for it by the
legislature when it created the Court in 2003.

